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VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
VOLUME 63 2018 NUMBER 5
Third Circuit Review
EDITORS’ PREFACE
IN 1973, the VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW launched the Third Circuit Review, aspecial compendium within the LAW REVIEW intended to survey prece-
dential opinions issued by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Cir-
cuit.1  In 2018 as we celebrate the Third Circuit Review’s 45th anniversary,
we use this opportunity to recount the Third Circuit Review’s robust history,
highlight distinguished contributors, and consider how the Third Circuit
Review may continue to provide value to our academic and practitioner
community.
When launching the Third Circuit Review, Volume XIX’s editors asked
Collins J. Seitz, then Chief Judge for Third Circuit, to write an introduc-
tion.2  Chief Judge Seitz identified a few guiding principles so that editors,
by “combining analysis with perspective,” could provide maximum value
“both to the judiciary and to the law.”3  While Chief Judge Seitz welcomed
critical analysis of the court’s opinions, his charge to the VILLANOVA LAW
REVIEW was not simply for editors to recite the court’s facts and holding
and analyze its reasoning.  Chief Judge Seitz wrote that editors were em-
powered to broadly contemplate the state of the law and the “particular
faults or virtue of each decision” free from practical realities that constrain
judicial decision-making.4  In other words, the Third Circuit Review could
1. See Forward, 19 VILL. L. REV. 277 (1973).  According to Volume XIX’s edi-
tors, the Third Circuit at that time was one of the few courts of appeals that did not
have “the dubious honor of having its opinions systematically subjected to the well-
meant, and, hopefully, studied analysis and criticism of fledgling members of the
legal community.” Id. at 277.  We are grateful to our predecessors for having the
foresight to position the Villanova Law Review to undertake such a responsibility.
We share their goal to further the Third Circuit Review’s legacy “in the hope that it
will be of benefit to practicing members of the bar, to the bench, and to the aca-
demic community.” Id.
2. Id. at 277.
3. See Collins J. Seitz, Introduction, 19 VILL. L. REV. 279 (1974); Forward, 19
VILL. L. REV. 277 (1973)
4. See id. at 280 (identifying practical restraints as “precedent, the contentions
of the parties before them, and the state of the record”).  Chief Judge Seitz
continued:
At the same time, the reviewers must realize that their own mandate is
broader than’ ours.  If a decision is correct, but the statute that controls it
(751)
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become a beacon of intellectual activity providing authors with space to
consider the law not only as it is, but the law as it should be.
Over the years, the structure of the Third Circuit Review has evolved
considerably.  Originally the project was led by a dedicated Third Circuit
Review Editor and it analyzed opinions by category, focusing on federal
matters like admiralty and maritime law, constitutional law, federal juris-
diction and procedure, government regulations, and federal statutes like
the Clean Air Act and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act.5  Members of the
bar occasionally contributed, and in 1979, six years after the Third Circuit
Review’s inaugural edition, editors decided to focus on publishing student
works, “both conventional ‘casenotes’ for reviews of single decisions and
more expansive ‘mini-comments’ and ‘comments’ for analyses of broader
areas of the law.”6
These casenotes were originally organized by topic.7  This topical cat-
egorization and the Third Circuit Review editor position eventually faded
away as the Third Circuit Review began to feature longer, student-written
articles analyzing five or six discrete precedential opinions.8  Titled case-
illogical, the reviewers are obligated  to bring to light the harmful conse-
quences that should require legislative action.  Such “in terrorem” argu-
ments are often made by attorneys to dissuade judges from following
admittedly controlling law.  It is as proper for law reviews to employ these
arguments in calling for legislative change as it would be improper for
judges to accede to them in deciding cases.  Similarly, law reviews are free
to call for the reversal of a precedent that, if made by our court, binds our
panel or, if a Supreme Court decision, binds our circuit en banc as well.
Id.
5. See, e.g., Various Editors, Admiralty and Maritime Law, 19 VILL. L. REV. 281
(1973); Various Editors, Federal Jurisdiction and Procedure, 19 VILL. L. REV. 325
(1973); Various Editors, Federal Jurisdiction and Procedure, 19 VILL. L. REV. 325
(1973); Various Editors, Federal Statutes and Government Regulation, 19 VILL. L. REV.
340 (1973); Kenneth A. Jacobsen, Administrative Law - Administrative Procedure Act -
Standing to Challenge Agency Action Requires a Showing That the Plaintiff Has Suffered
Injury in Fact to a Protected Interest from the Face of the Particular Statutory Provision
Allegedly Violated, or When Protective Intent Is Clear from Its Legislative History, 23 VILL.
L. REV. 580 (1978); Various Editors, Criminal Law, 24 VILL. L. REV. 263 (1979).
6. Dieter G. Struzyna, Third Circuit Review - Preface, 24 VILL. L. REV. 193 (1979);
see also, e.g., Barbara A. Schneller, Editor’s Preface, 26 VILL. L. REV. 557 (1981) (re-
taining student-authored format); Gary A. Rome, Federal Practice and Procedure -
Comment - Appealability and Finality in the Third Circuit - Is the United States Supreme
Court More Appealing Than the Third Circuit, 25 VILL. L. REV. 884 (1980).
7. See, e.g., Various Editors, Miscellaneous, 26 VILL. L. REV. 861 (1981); Various
Editors, Constitutional Law, 27 VILL. L. REV. 616 (1982); Anne P. Stark, Editor’s
Preface, 27 VILL. L. REV. 595 (1982).
8. See Frances M. Visco, Editor’s Preface, 28 VILL. L. REV. 649 (1983) (explaining
that length of student-written work has increased); see also Carolyn J. Warter, Civil
Rights - Title VI - The Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies Is Not a Prerequisite to a
Private Right of Action under Title VI, 28 VILL. L. REV. 693 (1983); Esther L. Bach-
rach, Materiality of Misrepresentations Made on Visa Applications in Light of Current Con-
gressional Policy, 31 VILL. L. REV. 1046 (1986); Mary J. Mullany, Health Law - Provider
Challenge to State Medicaid Reimbursement Plan, 37 VILL. L. REV. 1081 (1992); Chris-
tine M. Kovan, Disability Law - Susquenita School District v. Raelee S., Pendent Place-
2
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notes or casebriefs, these student articles often combined critical legal
analysis with practical advice for litigating attorneys.9
Despite the focus on publishing student pieces, articles submitted by
nonstudent authors were occasionally included in various issues.10  In
1997, for example, the Third Circuit Review published a “Report of the
Third Circuit Task Force on Equal Treatment in the Courts,” authored by
the Commission on Gender and the Commission on Race & Ethnicity.11
Additionally, numerous judges have contributed to the Third Circuit
Review throughout its history.12  United States Supreme Court Justice Wil-
liam J. Brennan wrote the introduction to the 1974-1975 issue to honor
Albert Branson Mars, a jurist who served on the Third Circuit, as well as
the Emergency Court of Appeals and as a district judge.13  Justice Brennan
reprised his role in the 1976-1977 issue by authoring a dedication to Third
Circuit Judge John Biggs., Jr.14
In 1983, the Third Circuit Review was dedicated to William H. Hastie, a
former Governor of the Virgin Islands and Third Circuit Judge and Chief
Judge Seitz authored an honorary introduction.15
In 1983, Chief Judge Seitz reprised his role to evaluate the Third Cir-
cuit Review’s purpose in celebration of its 10th anniversary.16  He en-
ment and Financial Responsibility under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act:
The Third Circuit’s Extension of Burlington, 42 VILL. L. REV. 1867 (1997).
9. See, e.g., Anna M. Maloney, Semerenko v. Cendant Corp.: The Third Circuit
Clarifies the Securities Exchange Commission’s Rule 10B-5 in the Context of Public Misrepre-
sentations, 47 VILL. L. REV. 1171 (2002); Anthony D. Foti, Could Jesus Serve on a Jury -
Not in the Third Circuit: Religion-Based Peremptory Challenges in United States v.
Dejesus and Bronshtein v. Horn, 51 VILL. L. REV. 1057 (2006); Brian J.
Boyle, Bright-Line Rules and Inefficient Markets: The Third Circuit’s 10b-5 Materiality
Doctrine is Ripe for Revision, 57 VILL. L. REV. 683 (2012); Carina M. Meleca, An “Of-
ficer” and a G[old]man: The Third Circuit Finds Ambiguous Corporate Titles Jeopardize
Right to Advancement Under Delaware Law in Aleynikov v. Goldman Sachs Group, Inc., 60
VILL. L. REV. 781 (2015).  The first casebrief appears to have been published in
1993.  Robert Ebby, Constitutional Law - When Does Guilty of Third Degree Murder
Equal Not Guilty by Reason of Insanity, 38 VILL. L. REV. 1153 (1993).  Additionally,
when the VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW launched Tolle Lege in 2012, casenotes analyzing
Third Circuit opinions were also published online. See, e.g., Douglas A. Behrens,
Blinded by the Light: The Third Circuit Curtails the Independent Ricci Defense in NAACP
v. North Hudson Regional Fire & Rescue, 58 VILL. L. REV. TOLLE LEGE 1 (2012).
10. See, e.g., Gerald Seipp, Third Circuit’s New Role as Activist Court on Immigra-
tion Issues, 51 VILL. L. REV. 981 (2006).
11. Report of the Third Circuit Task Force on Equal Treatment in the Courts, 42 VILL.
L. REV. 1355 (1997).
12. Indeed, in 1981, editors began publishing the list of judges currently serv-
ing on the circuit; a practice that remained until 1998. See, e.g., Various Editors,
Judges of the Court/Table of Cases, 26 VILL. L. REV. 558 (1981); Various Editors, Judges
of the Court/Table of Cases, 27 VILL. L. REV. 596 (1982).
13. See William J. Brennan Jr., Dedication to Albert Branson Maris, 20 VILL. L.
REV. 403 (1974).
14. William J. Brennan Jr., Third Circuit Review: Dedication, 22 VILL. L. REV. 579
(1976).
15. Collins J. Seitz, Dedication to William H. Hastie, 21 VILL. L. REV. 431 (1976).
16. Collins J. Seitz, Introduction, 28 VILL. L. REV. 651 (1983).
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couraged editors to scrutinize the Third Circuit Review’s utility and
purposefully consider “every aspect of its editorial process, from the selec-
tion of the topics or opinions it will explore to the legal analysis it offers its
readers.”17  He encouraged editors to avoid simply picking cases for the
mere fact that they lend themselves to criticism, and instead focus on the
in-depth, probing legal analysis that presents the facts of a case fairly and
objectively analyzes the court’s proposition.18
The next judicial introduction came from Third Circuit Judge Rug-
gero J. Aldisert in 1985.19  He provided the following suggestion to “in-
crease the quality of professional criticism”:
If opinion writing is a fine art, writing a criticism is an even finer
one.  First, it is essential that the analyst pinpoint the exact legal
dispute between the parties.  Second, if the critic casts stones at
the opinion writer’s reasoning, the stone thrower should recog-
nize the distinctions among the court’s reasoning process, the
weight given to the arguments, and the court’s exercise of value
judgment.  To implement these suggestions, the critic must fully
understand the nature of the judicial decision-making process, as
well as the sophisticated structure of “legal reasoning.”20
Third Circuit Judge Doloris K. Sloviter echoed many of Judge Aldis-
ert’s points when providing the introduction of the 20th anniversary issue
of the Third Circuit Review in 1993.21  She specifically questioned the Third
Circuit Review’s topic selection process, noting the reasons certain cases
were chosen to be critiqued were “not always clear.”22  She nevertheless
applauded the topical categorization of student critiques because it al-
lowed “the law review to study the unique culture that each court develops
over time.”23  In that spirit, she suggested the LAW REVIEW undertake
greater in-depth analyses over broader areas of the law in addition to re-
taining the casenote format to analyze specific opinions.24
In 1995, Chief Judge Seitz appeared once again in the Third Circuit
Review; but this time, as the recipient of five tributes honoring his status as
a giant within the legal field.  Tributes honoring Chief Judge Seitz were
authored by United States Supreme Court Chief Justice William Rehn-
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Ruggero J. Aldisert, Introduction, 30 VILL. L. REV. 828 (1985).
20. Id.
21. Dolores K. Sloviter, Introduction, 38 VILL. L. REV. 1089 (1993)
22. Id. at 1089–90. (“Some years the Annual Review has featured cases that
would be on any objective observer’s list of the most significant recent Third Cir-
cuit cases.  Surprisingly, other equally, if not more, influential decisions have been
overlooked.”).
23. Id. at 1090.
24. Id. at 1089–90.
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quist,25 United States Supreme Court Associate Justice William J. Brennan,
Jr.,26 Chief Justice of the Delaware Supreme Court E. Norman Veasey,27
Judge Sloviter,28 and one of Chief Judge Seitz’s former law clerks, Beth
Nolan.29
The next judicial contribution arrived in 2002, provided by Edward
Becker who, at that time, served as Chief Judge for the Third Circuit.30
Chief Judge Becker’s forward provided an overview of the history and
practices of appellate mediation within the Third Circuit.31
The Third Circuit Review last published a judicial author in 2012.  In
his introduction to the Third Circuit Review, Third Circuit Judge D. Michael
Fisher illuminated aspects of appellate judging that he contends may not
be readily apparent to readers of legal scholarship.32  Emphasizing the col-
legial nature of the appellate bench, Judge Fisher explained how judges
work together to arrive at a particular ruling and how opinions are circu-
lated among judges before they are ultimately published.33  He also ex-
plained that because the court relies on litigants and their advocates to
“identify gaps in the law and present arguments for why and how they
should be filled,” the court is not well-positioned to opine on “ancillary
areas of the law,” preferring instead to opine on the issue directly before
it.34
Reflecting on the contributions made by judges, practitioners, and
students, we are grateful that the Third Circuit Review has endeavored to
sustain a rich body of scholarly analysis.  As we continue to move the Third
Circuit Review’s legacy forward, we are reminded of Chief Judge Seitz’s
original charge to combine analysis with perspective to provide value to
our legal audiences.
25. William H. Rehnquist, Tribute to Judge Collins J. Seitz, 40 VILL. L. REV. 545
(1995).
26. William J. Brennan Jr., The Courage of Collins Seitz, 40 VILL. L. REV. 547
(1995).
27. E. N. Veasey, Collins Jacques Seitz Paradigm of Principle, Passion, Professional-
ism and Persuasion, 40 VILL. L. REV. 559 (1995)
28. Dolores K. Sloviter, Tribute to Collins J. Seitz: A Kind Man, 40 VILL. L. REV.
553 (1995).
29. Beth Nolan, Master of the Craft: A Tribute to Collins J. Seitz, 40 VILL. L. REV.
565 (1995).
30. Edward R. Becker, Foreword, 47 VILL. L. REV. 1055 (2002).
31. Id.
32. D. M. Fisher, Issues in the Third Circuit: Introduction, 57 VILL. L. REV. 675
(2012) (“What I find intriguing in this issue of the Villanova Law Review is its focus
on outcomes. That is, the case comments presented here provide insight into the
substance of our opinions, but, through no fault of the authors or editors, can
offer very little about how we got there. This is not a flaw, but rather a simple
reality: the decision-making process of an appellate court is not entirely reflected
in the text of an opinion, though the ultimate decision is.”).
33. Id. at 678.
34. Id. at 680.
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After speaking with judges, their law clerks, practitioners, and profes-
sors, we believe those who tune in to the Third Circuit’s decisions would
appreciate an effort that contemplates the Third Circuit’s jurisprudence
in its totality.  By an analogy, this effort would provide for the Third Cir-
cuit what the GEORGETOWN LAW JOURNAL’S ANNUAL REVIEW OF CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE provides for the criminal law community.35  Thus, we are en-
thusiastic to supplement the Third Circuit Review’s student-written casebrief
model with a new feature titled the “Precedential Opinion Summary.”
The Precedential Opinion Summary amalgamates precedential opin-
ions issued over the prior year, publishes their holdings, and provides in-
sight as to how those holdings fit within the broader context of the Third
Circuit’s jurisprudence.  Opinions that either decided issues of first im-
pression, received en banc consideration, or attracted concurring or dis-
senting opinions are highlighted.
Creating such a summary facilitates five objectives.  First, the summary
renders a service that no legal resource currently provides by simply hous-
ing Third Circuit precedential holdings in one quickly-accessible loca-
tion.36  Second, the summary helps scholars ascertain which areas of the
law are categorically receiving precedential attention, answering Judge
Sloviter’s call to pinpoint which legal doctrines remain stagnant and which
continue to evolve.  Third, by identifying the opinions receiving a concur-
rence or dissent, the summary identifies principles that remain unresolved
internally within the circuit or may subject to further dispute outside of it.
Fourth, when practitioners confront unfamiliar legal questions they can
use the summary to jumpstart legal research.  Fifth, the summary aids
those who must track circuit law developments by providing notice of a
new or changed rule.37
The Third Circuit Review’s Precedential Opinion Summary also honors
the VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW maxim of “Tolle Lege”.  Translated from Latin
35. See About the Annual Review of Criminal Procedure, GEORGETOWN LAW,
https://www.law.georgetown.edu/georgetown-law-journal/in-print/arcp/ [https:/
/perma.cc/2M7Z-FRDA] (last visited Nov. 15, 2018).
36. This fittingly comports with Villanova Law Library being a long-standing
repository of Third Circuit opinions. See Opinions of the United States Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit, Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law,
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit/ [https://perma.cc/
8BXB-ZTT3] (last visited Nov. 15, 2018) (“As the official backup archive for the
United States Court for the Third Circuit, Villanova University School of Law
maintains digital copies of all opinions filed by the Court since May of 1994.”).
37. For example, consider the value of such notice to jurists and practitioners
in routine criminal sentencing.  In United States v. Azcona-Polanco, 865 F.3d 148 (3d
Cir. 2017), the Third Circuit held that when imposing conditions of supervised
release upon a deportable immigrant, the district court must “explain and justify”
its decision in open court “so that the appellate court is not left to speculate about
the reasons.” Id. at 153 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).  Notice
of Azcona-Polanco’s mandate would be of obvious value to district court judges who
must adhere to the Third Circuit’s directives when administering sentencing collo-
quies, as well as to the government and defendants who rely on decisions like Az-
cona-Polanco when preparing for hearings.
6
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to English, Tolle Lege means “take up and read.”  This phrase honors the
Augustinian roots of Villanova University and can be directly traced to St.
Augustine’s conversion to Christianity.  Upon hearing the instruction to
take up and read, Augustine quite literally took up St. Paul’s Letter to the
Romans and simply read it.  This momentary decision to merely read
proved to be life changing for Augustine—and for all those who have sub-
scribed to Augustinian values since.
The VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW and the Third Circuit Precedential Opin-
ion Summary approaches legal scholarship through the lens of Tolle
Lege—striving to contribute relevant commentary that encourages the le-
gal community to take up and read.  By embracing the Tolle Lege perspec-
tive, we strive to add value to the legal community by challenging students,
practitioners, and jurists alike to apply arguments, analysis, and theory in a
way that positively impacts our world.38
Guided by these objectives and our mandate to survey precedential
law within the circuit, the Precedential Opinion Summary takes its maiden
voyage in Volume LXIII.  While we have set forth the summary’s initial
structure, we in no way hope that structure remains stagnant.  We en-
courage future VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW editors to further improve upon
the Precedential Opinion Summary’s format so that both the summary
and the entire Third Circuit Review remain responsive to the needs of the
academic and practitioner community.  We of course welcome all feed-
back in this endeavor.
38. See VILLANOVA UNIVERSITY OFFICE FOR MISSION & MINISTRY, TOLLE LEGE, xi
(2d ed. 2016), https://www1.villanova.edu/content/dam/villanova/mission/m
andm_assets/2016FINALFULLCOVER.pdf [https://perma.cc/N9JX-9VWF].  In
2012, the Villanova Law Review cemented its commitment to the Tolle Lege per-
spective when it introduced its online companion to the traditional print edition—
appropriately titled VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW TOLLE LEGE.  All articles published on
the online companion are provided a citation of VILL. L. REV. TOLLE LEGE.  Since
2012, VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW TOLLE LEGE has expanded the Law Review’s ability to
contribute scholarship to the legal profession and encourage others to take up and
read the knowledge that exists in our world.  Students, scholars, attorneys, judges,
and even lay individuals need not look any further than the Tolle Lege citation itself
to propel them in their scholarly endeavors.  Several articles providing in depth
analysis of Third Circuit decisions can also be found on VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
TOLLE LEGE. See, e.g., Robert Turchick, Is the FTC Playing Fair? The Third Circuit’s
Decision in FTC v. Wyndham Worldwide Corp. Furthers Agency’s Data Security Efforts
but Creates Tension for Smaller Businesses, 61 VILL. L. REV. TOLLE LEGE 71 (2016);
Travis Dunkelberger, Third Circuit Takes the Wind Out of Frivolous Litigators’ Sails in
Fair Wind Sailing, Inc. v. Dempster, 60 VILL. L. REV. TOLLE LEGE 121 (2015); John
D’Elia, Keeping FLSA’s Promises: The Third Circuit Extends the Law’s Reach to More Joint
Employers, Successors, and Supervisors in Thompson v. Real Estate Mortgage Network,
60 VILL. L. REV. TOLLE LEGE 93 (2015); Keely Collins, The Third Circuit Lays Another
Trap for Unsuspecting Employers: Lupyan v. Corinthian Colleges Inc., 60 VILL. L. REV.
TOLLE LEGE 47 (2015).  For additional publications discussing Third Circuit prece-
dent visit villanovalawreview.com.
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On behalf of Volumes LXIII and LXIV, we thank the students, faculty
advisors, and contributors who have grown the Third Circuit Review over
the past forty-five years.  It is in their honor that we answer Chief Judge








Executive Editor, Volume LXIV
THIRD CIRCUIT REVIEW: PRECEDENTIAL OPINION SUMMARY
The Precedential Opinion Summary collects precedential opinions is-
sued by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit between January 1,
2017 and December 1, 2017.  This compilation is designed to serve as a
research tool rather than provide comprehensive analysis on any particu-
lar opinion.  The summary is organized into two parts, civil and criminal
matters, and within each part by issues of first impression, cases heard en
banc, decisions concurrences or dissents, and an appendix of opinions
arranged by subject matter.
CIVIL MATTERS
Issues of First Impression
AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT – In McGann v. Cinemark USA,
Inc.,39 the Third Circuit decided what accommodations a movie theater
must provide to a blind and deaf patron.  Judge Restrepo writing on be-
half of Chief Judge Smith and Judge McKee vacated the district court and
held that the ADA’s requirement to provide “auxiliary aid or service” in-
cludes tactile interpreters at a movie theater.
ANTITRUST – IPSO FACTO IMMUNITY – In Edinboro College Park Apartments
v. Edinboro University Foundation,40 plaintiffs alleged that a state-owned uni-
versity in Pennsylvania “conspired to monopolize the student-housing mar-
ket in violation of Section 2 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2.”41  The
39. 873 F.3d 218 (3d Cir. 2017) (Restrepo, J.).
40. 850 F.3d 567 (3d Cir. 2017) (Smith, C.J.) (affirmed in part, reversed in
part).
41. Id. at 571.
8
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Third Circuit determined which level of scrutiny to evaluate the univer-
sity’s conduct and determine whether it was entitled to any state action
immunity.42  Reasoning that “the [u]niversity is more analogous to a mu-
nicipality than to a private market participant,” the court applied the inter-
mediate standard of review announced by the U.S. Supreme Court in
Town of Hallie v. City of Eau Claire43 and held that public universities are
not entitled to ipso facto immunity when facing antitrust claims.44
BANKRUPTCY – GRACE PERIODS – In In re Klaas,45 the Third Circuit
confronted an issue of first impression among all circuit courts:
“[W]hether bankruptcy courts have discretion to grant a brief grace pe-
riod and discharge debtors who cure an arrearage in their payment plan
shortly after the expiration of the plan term, and if so, what factors are
relevant for the bankruptcy court to consider when exercising that discre-
tion.”46  Judge Krause, joined by Judge Fisher and Judge Vanaskie, held
that bankruptcy courts do have such discretion and may “grant a reasona-
ble grace period for debtors to cure an arrearage.”47  The court identified
a non-exhaustive list of five factors that a bankruptcy court should use to
determine whether to allow a grace period.48
CIVIL PROCEDURE – FORUM SELECTION AND TRANSFER – In In Re Howme-
ica Osteonics Corp.,49 the Third Circuit devised a “separate framework to
determine how forum-selection clauses affect the § 1404(a) transfer analy-
sis where both contracting and non-contracting parties are found in the
same case and where the non-contracting parties’ private interests run
headlong into the presumption of Atlantic Marine Construction Co. v. U.S.
District Court, 134 S. Ct. 568 (2013).” Atlantic Marine provided that in situa-
tions where “contracting parties have specified the forum in which they
will litigate disputes arising from their contract, federal courts must honor
the forum-selection clause ‘[i]n all but the most unusual cases.’”50  Judge
Krause, writing for Judge Sirica and Judge Fuentes, created a four-step
inquiry to guide district courts: “(1) the forum-selection clauses, (2) the
private and public interests relevant to non-contracting parties, (3) thresh-
old issues related to severance, and (4) which transfer decision most pro-
motes efficiency while minimizing prejudice to non-contracting parties’
private interests.”51
42. Id. at 575.
43. 471 U.S. 34 (1985).
44. Edinboro College Park Apartments, 850 F.3d at 575.
45. 858 F.3d 820 (3d Cir. 2017) (Krause, J.).
46. Id. at 823.
47. Id. at 828.
48. Id. at 832.
49. 867 F.3d 390 (3d Cir. 2017) (Krause, J.) (vacated and remanded).
50. Id. at 378 (citations omitted).
51. Id. at 403–04.
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DECLARATORY JUDGMENT ACT – LEGAL AND DECLARATORY RELIEF – In
Rarick v. Federated Service Insurance Company,52 the Third Circuit considered
which standard a district court should use to review a complaint seeking
both legal and declaratory relief.  Splitting with the Second, Fourth, and
Fifth Circuits, while joining the Seventh and Ninth Circuits, Judge
Hardiman, writing for Judge Chagares and Judge Scirica, held that the
independent claim test is the appropriate standard.  That test “balances
the court’s duty to hear legal claims with its discretion to decline jurisdic-
tion over claims for declaratory relief. Under this test, the district court
first determines whether claims seeking legal relief are independent of
claims for declaratory relief.”53
IMMIGRATION – AGGRAVATED FELONY – In Mateo v. Attorney General
United States,54 Judge Vanaskie, writing on behalf of Judge McKee and
Judge Jordan, applied the constitutional void-for-vagueness doctrine to the
immigration context and joined the Sixth, Ninth, and Eleventh circuits to
hold that the definition of “crime of violence” under 18 U.S.C. § 16(b) is
unconstitutionally vague for purposes of the Immigration and Nationality
Act’s definition of an aggravated felony.55  The Supreme Court has
granted certiorari in the Ninth Circuit’s sister opinion, Lynch v. Dimaya,56
and the import of Mateo may be altered depending on Dimaya’s outcome.
IMMIGRATION – CRIME OF MORAL TURPITUDE – In ldefonso-Candelario v.
Attorney General of United States,57 the Third Circuit evaluated whether a
violation of 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 5101—a statute criminalizing “obstructing
the administration of law or other governmental function”—constitutes a
crime of moral turpitude under the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8
U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(I).  Judge Stearns, writing on behalf of Judge
Jordan and Judge Krause, applied the categorical approach to conclude
that it was not.58
EDUCATION – EQUAL EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITIES ACT OF 1974 – In
Issa v. School District of Lancaster,59 the Third Circuit held that to allege a
violation of the Equal Educational Opportunities Act of 1974 (EEOA), 20
U.S.C. § 1703(f), an individual “must satisfy four elements: (1) the defen-
dant must be an educational agency, (2) the plaintiff must face language
barriers impeding her equal participation in the defendant’s instructional
programs, (3) the defendant must have failed to take appropriate action
to overcome those barriers, and (4) the plaintiff must have been denied
equal educational opportunity on account of her race, color, sex, or na-
52. 852 F.3d 223 (3d Cir. 2017) (Hardiman, J.) (vacated and remanded).
53. Id. at 228.
54. 870 F.3d 228 (3d Cir. 2017) (Vanaskie, J.).
55. Id. at 234–35.
56. 137 S. Ct. 31 (2016).
57. 866 F.3d 102 (3d Cir. 2017) (Stearns, J.).
58. Id. at 107.
59. 847 F.3d 121 (3d Cir. 2017) (Fisher, J.) (affirmed and remanded).
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tional origin.”60  Regarding the third element and the “appropriate ac-
tion” requirement, Judge Fisher, joined by Judge Krause and Judge
Melloy, followed the approach taken by the Fifth Circuit in Castaneda v.
Pickard.61  The court did not adopt Castenada’s framework  “without quali-
fication,” however, and instead concluded that “fine tuning must await fu-
ture cases.”62  Judge Fisher commented that this was the first time the
Third Circuit was tasked with interpreting the EEOA.63
EDUCATION – ATTORNEY’S FEES AND THE INDIVIDUALS WITH DISABILITIES
EDUCATION ACT – In M.R. v. Ridley School District,64 the Third Circuit con-
sidered the “stay put” provision under the Individuals with Disabilities Ed-
ucation Act (IDEA) and whether a plaintiff, if prevailing under that
provision which provides “backward-looking and compensatory relief,”
may seek an award of attorney’s fees.65  Judge Krause, writing on behalf of
Judge Vanaskie and Judge Restrepo, held that a plaintiff under those cir-
cumstances constitutes a prevailing party, and accordingly, may seek to
recover attorneys’ fees.66
ELEVENTH AMENDMENT AND CLASS ACTIONS – Although the underlying
issue in In re Flonase Antitrust Litigation67 was a class action alleging viola-
tions of state antitrust law, Judge Greenaway writing on behalf of Judge
Chagares and Judge Vanaskie concluded that the Eleventh Amendment
applies to class action settlements and held that because state of Louisiana
had not waived sovereign immunity, it was not bound by a class settlement
that prohibited class members from bringing separate suits against each
other.  A petition for certiorari has been docketed to the U.S. Supreme
Court.68
FAIR HOUSING ACT – In Revock v. Cowpet Bay West Condominium Associa-
tion,69 the Third Circuit held that under federal common law, claims
under the Fair Housing Act “survive the death of a party.”70  Accordingly,
Judge Restrepo, joined by Judges Fuentes and Vanaskie, reversed the dis-
trict court’s grant of summary judgment.
FALSE CLAIMS ACT – In United States ex rel. Petras v. Simparel, Inc.,71 the
Third Circuit joined the Fifth and Ninth Circuits to hold that the Small
Business Administration, when acting as a receiver for a shareholder does
60. Id. at 131–32.
61. 648 F.2d 989, 1009–10 (5th Cir. 1981).
62. Id. at 134.
63. Id. at 124, 131.
64. 868 F.3d 218 (3d Cir. 2017) (Krause, J.) (reversed and remanded).
65. Id. at 225.
66. Id.
67. 879 F.3d 61 (3d Cir. 2017) (Greenaway, J).
68. 879 F.3d 61 (3d Cir. 2017), petition for cert. filed, 2018 WL 3361039 (U.S.
July 6, 2018) (No. 18-42).
69. 853 F.3d 96 (3d Cir. 2017) (Restrepo, J.) (reversed in part, vacated in
part)
70. Id. at 110.
71. 857 F.3d 497 (3d Cir. 2017) (McKee, J.) (affirmed).
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not act as the government, and accordingly, may not raise a claim under
the False Claims Act.  Judge McKee, writing for Judge Hardiman and
Judge Rendell, found that “when a federally chartered— but private—en-
tity is placed into receivership, the relevant federal agency, acting as re-
ceiver, takes over the day-to-day operations and assumes the powers of
shareholders, board of directors, and management.”72  Accordingly, the
entity does not act as the government.73
FALSE CLAIMS ACT – In United States ex rel. Spay v. CVS Caremark Corpora-
tion,74 the Third Circuit considered the “government knowledge infer-
ence” defense to False Claims Act violations.  That defense can “defeat a
finding of scienter in certain circumstances.”75  Joining six other circuits,
the Third Circuit held that “there are two prongs to [the] defense: (1) the
government knew about the alleged false statement(s), and (2) the defen-
dant knew that the government knew.”76  Judge McKee authored the opin-
ion of the court, joined by Chief Judge Smith and Judge Restrepo.
HOMEOWNERS PROTECTION ACT – In Fried v. JP Morgan Chase & Co.,77
the Third Circuit considered whether, under the Homeowners Protection
Act, 12 U.S.C. § 4901, a mortgage servicer could provide relief to a home-
owner struggling financially by lowering the principal of a mortgage while
simultaneously extending the term of the loan.78  Judge Ambro, writing
on behalf of Judge Vanaskie and Judge Scirica, held that the Act required
mortgage servicers, when modifying a loan, to link the end date of the
modified loan to the initial purchase price of the home, rather than link
the end date of modified loan to any updated property values estimated by
a broker as a result of the lowered principal.79  Judge Ambro concluded
that “the Protection Act required calculation of [the plaintiff’s] termina-
tion date on the basis of her home’s original value, which under the Act is
its purchase price.”80
PRODUCTS LIABILITY – In In re: Asbestos Products Liability Litigation,81 the
Third Circuit confronted an issue of first impression as to whether under
maritime law, a manufacturer constructing a certain type of “bare-metal”
product can be held liable for future asbestos-related injuries.  Splitting
with the Sixth Circuit and at least one district court,82 Judge Vanaskie,
72. Id. at 503 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).
73. Id. at 366.
74. 875 F.3d 746 (3d Cir. 2017) (McKee, J.) (affirmed)
75. Id. at 748.
76. Id. at 758.
77. 850 F.3d 590 (3d Cir. 2017) (Ambro, J.) (affirmed, remanded).
78. Id. at 593.
79. Id. at 593.
80. Id. at 593.
81. 873 F.3d 232 (3d Cir. 2017), cert. granted, 138 S. Ct. 1990 (2018) (Vanas-
kie, J.).
82. Id. at 235 (citing Lindstrom v. A-C Prod. Liab. Tr., 424 F.3d 488, 492,
494–97 (6th Cir. 2005); Cabasug v. Crane Co., 989 F. Supp. 2d 1027, 1038–43 (D.
Haw. 2013)).
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writing on behalf of Judge Shwartz and Restrepo, joined other district
courts to hold that a manufacturer could be liable if the asbestos related
injury was a “reasonably foreseeable result of the manufacturer’s actions”
in the context of a negligence claim.83  The U.S. Supreme Court has
granted certiorari on this case.84
PENNSYLVANIA INSURANCE CODE – Although In re Trustees of Conneaut
Lake Park, Inc.85 case arose in the context of bankruptcy proceedings, the
Third Circuit faced an issue of first impression in Pennsylvania law inter-
preting Section 638 of Pennsylvania’s Insurance Code and the phrase
“named insured” therein.  Under Section 683, an insurance company may
not pay fire insurance proceeds to a named insured before the company
contacts the local municipality to determine whether delinquent taxes are
owned on the property.  In this case, the named insured was not responsi-
ble for the delinquent taxes, and thus, the Third Circuit had to determine
whether the named insured was eligible to recover under the policy.  Pre-
dicting how the Pennsylvania Supreme Court might rule, Judge
Hardiman, writing on behalf of Judges Fisher and Greenaway, reversed the
district court, holding the text of the statute required the named insured
to pay delinquent taxes; even though in this case, the entity clearly respon-
sible for those taxes was not the same entity as the named insured.  Al-
though the named insured here argued that it suffered a Fifth
Amendment taking because its insurance proceeds went to the govern-
ment, the Third Circuit disagreed, explaining that the named insured had
did not have a legally cognizable property interest in the proceeds greater
than that of the taxing authorities.
PRISONER LITIGATION – IN FORMA PAUPERIS – In Parker v. Montgomery
County Correctional Facility/Business Office Manager,86 the Third Circuit split
with the Ninth Circuit to hold that an indigent prisoner is not entitled to
proceed in forma pauperis to appeal a court’s determination that the pris-
oner has received a third-strike under 28 U.S.C.A. § 1915(g).87  Chief
Judge Smith, writing on behalf of Judge Fuentes and Judge Stark,88 rea-
soned that the plain language of the statute required such an outcome.89
RELIGIOUS FREEDOM RESTORATION ACT – ACA CONTRACEPTIVE MAN-
DATE – In Real Alternatives, Inc. v. Secretary Department of Health and Human
Services,90 the Third Circuit considered a claim involving the Religious
83. Id. at 235 (citing Quirin v. Lorillard Tobacco Co., 17 F. Supp. 3d 760,
768–70 (N.D. Ill. 2014); Chicano v. Gen. Elec. Co., No. Civ. A. 03-5126, 2004 WL
2250990, at *6 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 5, 2004)).
84. 138 S. Ct. 1990 (2018).
85. 855 F.3d 519 (3d Cir. 2017) (Hardiman, J.).
86. 870 F.3d 144 (3d Cir. 2017) (Smith, C.J.).
87. Id. at 153.
88. The Honorable Leonard P. Stark, Chief Judge of the United States Dis-
trict Court for the District of Delaware, sat by designation.
89. Id. at 152.
90. 867 F.3d 338 (3d Cir. 2017) (Rendell, J.) (Jordan, J. concurring in part
and dissenting in part) (affirmed).
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Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) and the Patient Protection and Afforda-
ble Care Act’s contraceptive mandate.91  Specifically, the court had to de-
termine whether “employees, who oppose contraceptives on religious
grounds but work for secular employers, experience a substantial burden
on their religious exercise when the government regulates group health
care plans and health care insurance providers by requiring them to offer
health insurance coverage that includes coverage for services the employ-
ees find incompatible with their religious beliefs.”92  Judge Rendell, writ-
ing on behalf of Judge Greenaway and Judge Jordan, concluded the
plaintiffs did not show that the contraceptive mandate “imposes a substan-
tial burden on their religious beliefs” and accordingly declined to “reach
the question of whether the [c]ontraceptive [m]andate is the least restric-
tive means of furthering a compelling governmental interest.”93  Judge
Jordan wrote separately to concur in part and dissent in part, and opined
that the plaintiffs had “adequately pled and provided sufficient evidence
to demonstrate that the [c]ontraceptive [m]andate is a substantial burden
on their free exercise of religion.”94
SECTION 1983 – DELIBERATE INDIFFERENCE – In Pearson v. Prison Health
Service,95 the Third Circuit considered “whether and when medical expert
testimony may be necessary to create a triable issue on the subjective
prong of a deliberate indifference case.”96  Judge Fisher, joined by Judge
Krause and Judge Greenberg, held that “medical expert testimony may be
necessary in some adequacy of care cases when the propriety of a particu-
lar diagnosis or course of treatment would not be apparent to a layper-
son.”97  The court concluded, however, that testimony was not necessary
under the circumstances of this case.98
SECTION 1983 – EXCESSIVE FORCE CLAIM – In Davenport v. Borough of
Homestead,99 the Third Circuit discussed when excessive force claims
should be analyzed under the Fourth or Fourteenth Amendment.100
Judge Fisher, joined by Judge Roth and Judge Hardiman, held that “a pas-
senger shot by an officer during the course of a vehicular pursuit may seek
relief under the Fourth Amendment” and concluded that the district
court erred in “independently analyzing [plaintiff’s] Fourth and Four-
91. Id. at 342–43.
92. Id. at 354–55.
93. Id. at 366.
94. Id. at 367 (Jordan, J. concurring in part and dissenting in part).
95. 850 F.3d 526 (3d Cir. 2017) (Fisher, J.) (affirmed in part, reversed in part,
remanded).
96. Id. at 535.
97. Id. at 537.
98. Id. at 537–38.
99. 870 F.3d 273 (3d Cir. 2017) (Fisher, J.).
100. Id. at 276–77.
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teenth Amendment claims.”101  The Third Circuit joined the Fourth,
Fifth, and Eleventh Circuits in making this determination.102
SECTION 1983 – FIRST AMENDMENT RETALIATION – In Fields v. City of
Philadelphia,103 the Third Circuit concurred with the First, Fifth, Seventh,
Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits in holding that “First Amendment protects
the act of photographing, filming, or otherwise recording police officers
conducting their official duties in public.”104  The court nevertheless con-
cluded that police officers were entitled to qualified immunity in plain-
tiff’s First Amendment Retaliation claim.105  The case came before Judge
Ambro, Judge Restrepo, Judge Nygaard, with Judge Ambro writing the
opinion of the court.  Judge Nygaard dissented, arguing that the right at
issue was clearly established.106
SECTION 1983 – FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT DUE PROCESS – In Steele v.
Cicchi,107 the Judge Restrepo, writing on behalf of Judge Ambro and Judge
Nygaard, concluded that a defendant has “a protected liberty interest in
exercising his bail option once his bail was set” and a violation of that
liberty interest could amount to a due process violation.108  The court
joined the Tenth and Eleventh Circuits in making this determination.109
TITLE VII – EMPLOYER RETALIATION – In Carvalho–Grevious v. Delaware
State University,110 the Third Circuit examined “what a plaintiff must bring
as part of her prima facie case of retaliation to survive a motion for sum-
mary judgment in the wake of the Supreme Court’s decision in Nassar,
which held that ‘Title VII retaliation claims must be proven according to
traditional principles of but-for causation.’”111  Judge Fisher, joined by
Chief Judge Smith and Judge Ambro, concluded that a plaintiff need not
establish but-for causation in his or her prima facie case.112  The court
held that “at the prima facie stage, a plaintiff need only proffer evidence
sufficient to raise the inference that her engagement in a protected activ-
ity was the likely reason for the adverse employment action, not the but-for
101. Id. at 279.
102. Id.
103. 862 F.3d 353 (3d Cir. 2017) (Ambro, J.) (reversed and remanded) (Nyg-
aard, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
104. Id. at 355–56.
105. Id. at 355.
106. Id. at 362.
107. 855 F.3d 494 (3d Cir. 2017) (Restrepo, J) (affirmed),
108. Id. at 502–04.
109. Id.
110. 851 F.3d 249 (3d Cir. 2017) (Fisher, J.) (affirmed in part, reversed in
part).
111. Id. at 257 (quoting Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 570 U.S. 338
(2013)).
112. Id. at 253.
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reason.”113  The court joined the Fourth Circuit in making this
determination.114
TITLE IX – EDUCATION PROGRAM –  In Doe v. Mercy Catholic Medical
Center,115 the Third Circuit joined the Second Circuit to hold that “a ‘pro-
gram or activity’ under § 1687 is an ‘education program or activity’ under
§ 1681(a) if it has ‘features such that one could reasonably consider its
mission to be, at least in part, educational.’”116  Judge Fisher, writing on
behalf of Judge Krause and Judge Melloy,117 found that a hospital’s resi-
dency program qualified as such a program or activity.  The Court also
joined the First and Fourth Circuits, and rejected approaches taken by the
Fifth and Seventh Circuits, to hold that “a private quid pro quo claim exists
for employees of federally-funded education programs under Title IX not-
withstanding Title VII’s concurrent applicability, for private-sector employ-
ees may pursue independently their rights under both Title VII and other
applicable federal statutes.”118
TRADEMARKS – THE MCCARTHY TEST – In Covertech Fabricating, Inc. v.
TVM Building Products, Inc.,119 the Third Circuit had to decide between
the “First Use Test” and  the “McCarthy Test” in adopting a framework to
assess the rightful owner of a trademark.120  Judge Krause, writing on be-
half of Judge Jordan and Judge Vanaskie, adopted the McCarthy test, and
held “that as between a manufacturer and its exclusive distributor, there is
a rebuttable presumption of initial trademark ownership in favor of the
manufacturer, and that [six-factor McCarthy] test is the proper analytical
tool through which a distributor may attempt to rebut that presumption in
the absence of a contractual agreement.”121  Judge Krause noted that this
test is consistently used in some form by other circuits, including the Sev-
enth and Ninth.122
En Banc
MARITIME – COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENTS – In Joyce v. Maersk
Line Ltd,123 the Third Circuit overruled its prior holding in Barnes v.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 259.  It appears that the circuit law is muddled on this issue. See
Foster v. Univ. of Md.–E. Shore, 787 F.3d 243, 251 n.10 (4th Cir. 2015) (collecting
cases).
115. 850 F.3d 545 (3d Cir. 2017) (Fisher, J.) (affirmed in part, reversed in
part).
116. Id. at 555.
117. Senior Circuit Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Cir-
cuit sat by designation. Id. at 545.
118. Id. at 564.
119. 855 F.3d 163 (3d Cir. 2017) (Krause, J.) (affirmed in part, vacated in
part).
120. Id. at 170.
121. Id. at 171.
122. Id. at 171–72.
123. 876 F.3d 502 (3d Cir. 2017) (Jordan, J.) (affirmed).
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Andover Co., L.P.124 to hold that “a union contract freely entered by a sea-
farer—a contract that includes rates of maintenance, cure, and unearned
wages—will not be reviewed piecemeal by courts unless there is evidence
of unfairness in the collective bargaining process.”125  Writing for the
court, Judge Jordan explained that adherence to a collective bargaining
agreement made more sense in modern times because “the need for judi-
cial intervention to protect seamen has been substantially lessened and
thus the common law basis for requiring courts to disregard the freely
negotiated agreements of private parties and to refuse to enforce the
terms of the collective bargaining agreement also carries substantially less
force.”126 Judge Jordan further explained that by overruling Barnes, the
Third Circuit was now joining every other circuit to have considered this
question.127
Split Decisions
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW – CHEVRON DEFERENCE – In Egan v. Delaware
River Port Authority,128 a plaintiff brought a retaliation claim against his
employer under the Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993 (FMLA), 29
U.S.C. § 2601 et seq.129  The claim brought a complex question of adminis-
trative law as the Third Circuit had to “examine the regulation upon
which [the plaintiff’s] FMLA retaliation claim is based and determine
whether there is any requirement that a plaintiff introduce direct evidence
of retaliation to pursue a mixed-motive theory of liability.”130  Judge
Shwartz, writing on behalf of Chief Judge Smith and Judge Jordan, held
that the regulation was entitled to Chevron deference.131
Although he concurred in the judgment, Judge Jordan wrote sepa-
rately to express his “discomfort” with the court’s reasoning as “dictated by
the regimes of deference adopted by the Supreme Court in Chevron,
U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984),
and Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452 (1997).”132 He explains that this defer-
ence doctrine “embed perverse incentives in the operations of govern-
ment; they spread the spores of the ever-expanding administrative state;
they require us at times to lay aside fairness and our own best judgment
and instead bow to the nation’s most powerful litigant, the government,
for no reason other than that it is the government.”133
124. 900 F.2d 630 (3d Cir. 1990).
125. Id. at 503.
126. Id. at 509 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
127. Id. at 512.
128. 851 F.3d 263 (3d Cir. 2017) (Shwartz, J.)
129. Id. at 266–67.
130. Id. at 267.
131. Id. at 274.
132. Id. at 278.
133. Id.
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ANTITRUST – In Valspar Corporation v. E.I. Du Pont De Nemours and
Company,134 the Third Circuit considered whether a defendant violated
Section 1 of the Sherman Act by appearing to conspire with other manu-
facturers by raising prices at the same time.135  Defendants argued that
this was not a Sherman Act violation “because the market for titanium
dioxide is an oligopoly” and accordingly, “the price movement was caused
by ‘conscious parallelism’—an economic theory that explains oligopolists
will naturally follow a competitor’s price increase in the hopes that each
firm’s profits will increase.”136  The district court agreed and granted sum-
mary judgement in favor of defendants, and Judge Hardiman writing for
the court affirmed.137  Judge Stengel dissented, opining that issues of fact
precluded granting summary judgement.138
CLASS CERTIFICATION – ASCERTAINABILITY – In City Select Auto Sales Inc.
v. BMW Bank of North America Inc.,139 the Third Circuit considered whether
putative plaintiffs sufficiently met Rule 23’s ascertainability requirement in
a motion for class certification.140  Judge Scirica, writing on behalf of
Judge Krause and Judge Fuentes, held that the plaintiffs had sufficiently
met the ascertainability requirement and vacated the judgement of the
district court.141  Judge Fuentes wrote separately in a concurring opinion
to specifically critique the Third Circuit’s treatment of the ascertainability
requirement under Rule 23, and would have joined the Third Circuit with
the Second, Sixth, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits to reject it.
COMMERCIAL LAW – ARBITRATION – In White v. Sunoco, Inc.,142 the
Third Circuit considered whether a defendant can compel a plaintiff to
arbitration if the plaintiff signed a credit card agreement with a third-party
not named in the law suit, and the defendant is a neither mentioned in
the credit card agreement nor is a signatory.143  The district court denied
the defendant’s motion to compel arbitration, and in an opinion joined by
Judge Chagares and Restrepo, the Third Circuit affirmed.144  Judge Roth
dissented and opined that the credit card agreement was an integrated
contract.145  Accordingly, she concluded that under basic contract inter-
pretation principles, the plaintiff could be compelled to arbitration.146
134. 873 F.3d 185 (3d Cir. 2017) (Hardiman, J.) (affirmed).
135. Id. at 189.
136. Id. at 189–90.
137. Id. at 190.
138. Id. at 203.
139. 867 F.3d 434 (3d Cir. 2017) (Scirica, J.) (vacated and remanded) (Fuen-
tes, J. concurring).
140. Id. at 436.
141. Id. at 436.
142. 870 F.3d 257 (3d Cir. 2017) (Chagares, J.).
143. Id. at 259.
144. Id.
145. Id. at 268–69.
146. Id. at 269.
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EMPLOYMENT LAW – NEW JERSEY CONSCIENTIOUS EMPLOYEE PROTEC-
TION ACT –  In Trzaska v. L’Oreal USA, Inc.,147 a plaintiff alleged a claim
under the New Jersey Conscientious Employee Protection Act
(CEPA).148The plaintiff claimed his employer fired him for refusing “to
violate various ethical rules that govern the legal profession” and accord-
ingly, “asserts that this action violated New Jersey employment law, as one
cannot be fired for refusing to violate regulations or public policy at the
instruction of his employer.”149  Judge Ambro, writing on behalf of Judge
Chagares and Judge Fuentes, reversed the district court’s grant of the de-
fendant’s motion to dismiss, holding that the plaintiff had alleged a plausi-
ble claim.150  Judge Chagares dissented, arguing in part that plaintiff had
not met his burden under CEPA to state a claim that would survive a mo-
tion to dismiss.151
SECTION 1983 – STATE ACTION – In Borrell v. Bloomsburg University,152
the Third Circuit decided whether a program director of a joint partner-
ship between a public university and private hospital was a state actor for
liability purposes under § 1983.153  Judge Hardiman, writing on behalf of
Judge Fisher and Judge Roth, held the program director was not a state
actor.154  Judge Roth concurred in the judgment but wrote separately to
explain why she believed the plaintiff received the due process she was
entitled to.155
STANDING – In Cottrell v. Alcon Laboratories,156 the Third Circuit re-
versed the district court’s dismissal of a class action alleging violation of
consumer protection statutes.  Plaintiffs alleged that “manufacturers and
distributors of the medication packaged it in such a way that forced them
to waste it.”  Judge Restrepo, joined by Judge Chagares, concluded the
plaintiffs had alleged injury in fact, and thus, had standing.  Judge Roth
dissented, opining that the plaintiffs did not have standing because their
injuries were too speculative.
UNITED STATES HOUSING ACT – RIGHT TO REMAIN –  In Hayes v. Har-
vey,157 the Third Circuit considered whether the United States Housing
Act of 1937’s enhanced voucher provision, 42 U.S.C. § 1437f(t), creates
for tenants an enforceable “right to remain in their unit as long as it is
147. 865 F.3d 155 (3d Cir. 2017) (Ambro, J.) (affirmed) (Chagares, J. concur-
ring in part and dissenting in part).
148. Id. at 157.
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Id. at 164.
152. 870 F.3d 154 (3d Cir. 2017) (Hardiman, J.) (Roth, J. concurring in part)
(reversed and remanded).
153. Id. at 160–61.
154. Id. at 162.
155. Id. at 163–64.
156. 874 F.3d 154 (3d Cir. 2017) (Restrepo, J.).
157. 874 F.3d 98 (2017).
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offered for rental housing.”158  Writing the opinion of the court, Judge
Fisher held it did not, and concluded that the “§ 1437f(t)(1)(B) obligates
HUD to provide ‘enhanced’ financial assistance to be credited toward an
assisted family’s rental obligations during any period in which the family
remains eligible under § 1437f(t)(1)(C), and that § 1437f(t)(1)(C) speaks
only to the ways in which the family’s conduct may relieve HUD of that
financial obligation.”159
Judge Greenaway dissented, arguing that the statute plainly means
“landlords may not evict enhanced voucher-holders without cause.”160  He
concluded that the majority erred by being “at odds not only with the
statutory text, but with the interpretations of the other two branches of
government as well. HUD—the expert agency tasked with administering
this statute—has found a right to remain.”161
This judgement was later vacated by Hayes v. Harvey162 when the court
met en banc in 2018.  Judge Greenaway, writing on behalf of the entire
court, concluded that “because the statute’s plain language and history
make evident that enhanced voucher holders may not be evicted absent
good cause, even at the end of a lease term.”163
EMPLOYMENT – NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD – In National Labor
Relations Board v. New Vista Nursing and Rehabilitation,164 the Third Circuit
evaluated the National Labor Relation Board’s conclusion that an em-
ployer acted unlawfully by disallowing employees to unionize and subse-
quently refusing to bargain with them.165  Writing for the court, Chief
Judge Smith explained that the National Labor Relation Board erred in
making such a conclusion because it applied a test at odds with Third
Circuit precedent in NLRB v. Attleboro Associates, Ltd., 176 F.3d 154 (3d Cir.
1999).166  The court remanded the case to the National Labor Relation
Board so that they could properly consider the question presented under
Attleboro.167
Judge Greenaway wrote separately critiquing the majority’s reasoning,
specifically its interpretation of two Third Circuit decisions: NLRB v. Att-
leboro Associates, Ltd., 176 F.3d 154 (3d Cir. 1999), and Mars Home for Youth
v. NLRB, 666 F.3d 850 (3d Cir. 2011).168
158. Id. at 100.
159. Id.
160. Id. at 111.
161. Id. at 111.
162. 903 F.3d 32 (3d Cir. 2018).
163. Id. at 35.  Judge Fisher and Judge Hardiman—who supported the 2017
Harvey opinion—dissented in the 2018 en banc opinion.
164. 70 F.3d 113 (3d Cir. 2017) (Smith, C.J.) (remanded) (Greenaway, J. con-
curring in part and dissenting in part).
165. Id. at 116.
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. Id. at 136.
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SECTION 1983 – QUALIFIED IMMUNITY – In Kedra v. Schroeter,169 the
Third Circuit reversed the district court’s dismissal of a § 1983 substantive
due process claim on qualified immunity grounds.170  Judge Krause, writ-
ing on behalf of Judge Melloy, found the law clearly established “an indi-
vidual’s right not to be subjected, defenseless, to a police officer’s
demonstration of the use of deadly force in a manner contrary to all appli-
cable safety protocols.”171  In a concurring opinion, Judge Fisher stated he
would define the clearly established right more narrowly, “as: a police of-
ficer’s right not to be subjected to a firearms training in which the instruc-
tor acts with deliberate indifference, that is, consciously disregards a
known risk of death or great bodily harm.”172
RELIGIOUS FREEDOM RESTORATION ACT – ACA CONTRACEPTIVE MAN-
DATE – For a discussion of Real Alternatives, Inc. v. Secretary Department of
Health and Human Services, see supra section C.
TAX – Ilfeld Doctrine –  In Duquesne Light Holdings, Inc. & Subsidiaries
v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue,173 the Judge Ambro, Judge Krause, and
Judge Hardiman interpreted the “Ilfeld doctrine” named for Charles Ilfeld
Co. v. Hernandez, 292 U.S. 62 (1934), which holds that the Internal Reve-
nue Code “should not be interpreted to allow [the taxpayer] ‘the practical
equivalent of a double deduction’ . . . absent a clear declaration of intent
by Congress.”174  Judge Ambro wrote the opinion of the court, and he
concluded that the tax court properly applied the Ilfeld doctrine to grant
summary judgement to the Internal Revenue Service.175
Judge Hardiman dissented, explaining: “[a]ccording to the Majority,
this case concerns the continued vitality of the so-called Ilfeld doctrine for
interpreting the Internal Revenue Code.  Yet there can be no doubt
that Ilfeld retains its vitality as a precedent of the Supreme Court . . . the
true question presented is whether Ilfeld applies where, as here, a hastily
issued regulation authorizes the very actions that Ilfeld cautions
against.”176  Accordingly, he opines that summary judgment in favor of
the Internal Revenue Service was improper.177
TITLE VII – SUPERVISOR –  In Moody v. Atlantic City Board of Educa-
tion,178 Judge Shwartz writing on behalf of Judge Greenaway and Judge
Rendell engaged in a fact-sensitive analysis to conclude that the district
court erred in finding that an individual was not plaintiff’s supervisor for
169. 876 F.3d 424 (3d Cir. 2017) (Krause, J.) (Fisher, J. concurring).
170. Id. at 432.
171. Id. at 449.
172. Id. at 458.
173. 861 F.3d 396 (3d Cir. 2017) (Ambro, J.) (affirmed) (Hardiman, J.
dissenting).
174. Id. at 399.
175. Id. at 399.
176. Id. at 417.
177. Id. at 426.
178. 870 F.3d 206 (3d Cir. 2017) (Shwartz, J.).
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purposes of a sexual harassment claim under Title VII.179  Judge Rendell
wrote separately, concurring in part and dissenting in part, and opined
that the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Vance v. Ball State University180
precluded such a finding.  She argued that under Vance, “the responsibility
to direct others does not make an employee a ‘supervisor.’”181
Appendix of Precedential Civil Opinions
Abstention
Hamilton v. Bromley, 862 F.3d 329 (3d Cir. 2017) (Fisher, J.) (affirmed
on alternate grounds) (rejecting district court’s dismissal on Younger ab-
stention because it did not resolve first whether the case was moot because
“a federal court can abstain from exercising its jurisdiction only if it has
jurisdiction to abstain from”).
Administrative Law
Council Tree Investors, Inc. v. Federal Communications Commission, 863
F.3d 237 (3d Cir. 2017) (Hardiman, J.) (holding that Federal Communica-
tions Commission “acted legally when it limited the bidding credits availa-
ble” to designated entities).
Egan v. Delaware River Port Authority, 851 F.3d 263 (3d Cir. 2017)
(Shwartz, J.) (affirmed in part, vacated and remanded in part) (upholding
Department of Labor regulation interpreting the Family and Medical
Leave Act under Chevron) (Jordan, J. concurring) (expressing discomfort
with regime of Chevron deference).
Delaware Riverkeeper Network v. Secretary of Pennsylvania Department of En-
vironmental Protection, 870 F.3d 171 (3d Cir. 2017) (Smith, J.) (denying pe-
tition to review Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Protection
approval of an interstate pipeline project under the Natural Gas Act of
1938 and noting that “agency’s unique interpretation of water depen-
dency is reasonable and worthy of deference”).
Delaware Riverkeeper Network v. United States Army Corps of Engineers, 869
F.3d 148 (3d Cir. 2017) (Smith, C.J.) (denying petition to review Penn-
sylvania Department of Environmental Protection approval of an inter-
state pipeline project under the Natural Gas Act of 1938).
Antitrust
In re Wellbutrin XL Antitrust Litigation Indirect Purchaser Class, 868 F.3d
132 (3d Cir. 2017) (Jordan, J.) (affirming district court’s grant of summary
judgement to drug manufacturer on antitrust violation claims).
179. Id. at 210–18.
180. 570 U.S. 421, 429 (2013).
181. Moody, 870 F.3d at 227 (Rendell, J. concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
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In re Lipitor Antitrust Litigation, 868 F.3d 231 (3d Cir. 2017) (Smith,
C.J.) (reversed and remanded) (reversing district court’s dismissal of
claims because plaintiffs plausibly pled that defendants entered into “re-
verse payment settlement agreements” and such agreements are subject to
antitrust scrutiny).
Edinboro College Park Apartments v. Edinboro University Foundation, 850
F.3d 567 (3d Cir. 2017) (Smith, C.J.) (affirmed in part, reversed in part)
(issue of first impression) (applying intermediate standard of review in
Town of Hallie v. City of Eau Claire, 471 U.S. 34 (1985) and holding that
public universities are not entitled to ipso facto immunity when facing
claims arising under Section 2 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2).
Valspar Corporation v. E.I. Du Pont De Nemours and Company, 873 F.3d
185 (3d Cir. 2017) (Hardiman, J.) (affirmed) (affirming district court’s
grant of summary judgment to plaintiff in price fixing action under the
Sherman Act) (Stengel, C.J. dissenting)182 (opining that fact issues should
have precluded summary judgement).
Bankruptcy
In re Klaas, 858 F.3d 820 (3d Cir. 2017) (Krause, J.) (affirmed) (issue
of first impression) (holding “that bankruptcy courts retain discretion
under the Bankruptcy Code to grant a reasonable grace period for debtors
to cure an arrearage”).
In re Linear Electric Company, Inc., 852 F.3d 313 (3d Cir. 2017) (Roth,
J.) (holding suppliers violated automatic stay in bankruptcy proceedings
by asserting construction lien against owner of property where supplies
were installed).
In re Lansaw, 853 F.3d 657 (3d Cir. 2017) (Melloy, J.)183 (concluding
that conclude that 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) “authorizes the award of emotional-
distress damages and that the [plaintiffs] presented sufficient evidence to
support such an award” and concluding that plaintiffs were also properly
awarded punitive damages).
In re Giacchi, 856 F.3d 244 (3d Cir. 2017) (Roth, J.) (affirming district
court’s denial of discharge under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(1)(B)).
In re Ross, 858 F.3d 779 (3d Cir. 2017) (Vanaskie, J.) (vacated and
remanded) (holding that “bankruptcy court does indeed have the author-
ity to issue a filing injunction even in the context of approving a
debtor’s 11 U.S.C. § 1307(b) voluntary dismissal because nothing in the
Bankruptcy Code’s express terms says otherwise”).
182. Lawrence F. Stengel, Chief United States District Judge for the Eastern
District of Pennsylvania, sitting by designation.
183. Michael J. Melloy, Senior Circuit Judge, United States Court of Appeals
for the Eighth Circuit, sat by designation. In re Lansaw, 853 F.3d 657, 660 (3d Cir.
2017).
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In re SemCrude L.P., 864 F.3d 280 (3d Cir. 2017) (Ambro, J.) (af-
firming bankruptcy court’s grant of summary judgment to downstream
purchasers).
In re World Imports, Ltd., 862 F.3d 338 (3d Cir. 2017) (Hardiman, J.)
(reversed and remanded) (holding that “received” in 11 U.S.C.
§ 503(b)(9) requires physical possession).
In re AE Liquidation, Inc., 866 F.3d 515 (3d Cir. 2017) (Krause, J.) (af-
firming bankruptcy and district court and holding that under the Worker
Adjustment and Retraining Notification (WARN) Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 2101—
2109, “a business must notify its employees of a pending layoff once the
layoff becomes probable”).
In Re: J & S Properties, LLC, 872 F.3d 138 (3d Cir. 2017) (Hardiman,
J.) (holding that “qualified immunity applies to discretionary actions taken
by a trustee to preserve the bankruptcy estate’s assets”) (Fisher, J. concur-
ring) (concurring in judgment but opining that issue of qualified immu-
nity was not properly before the court).
In re Pursuit Capital Management, LLC, 874 F.3d 124 (3d Cir. 2017)
(Jordan, J.) (holding appeal statutorily moot under 11 U.S.C. § 363(m)
and affirming district court’s dismissal).
In re Bressman, 874 F.3d 142 (3d Cir. 2017) (Roth, J.) (affirming dis-
trict and bankruptcy court’s dismissal of plaintiff’s claims after finding
plaintiff’s attorney committed fraud on the court).
Civil Procedure
Collins v. Mary Kay, Inc., 874 F.3d 176 (Restrepo, J.) (affirmed) (inter-
preting forum selection clause and holding state not federal law governed
interpretation questions).
Halley v. Honeywell International, Inc., 861 F.3d 481 (3d Cir. 2017) (Scir-
ica, J.) (affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded) (affirming
court’s approval of settlement and attorney fee award but remanding to
ask district court to explain with specificity why costs were awarded).
Blanyar v. Genova Products Inc., 861 F.3d 426 (3d Cir. 2017) (Vanaskie,
J.) (affirmed) (affirming dismissal of complaint because plaintiffs “did not
exercise the reasonable diligence required for the discovery rule to toll the
statute of limitations”).
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. City of Long Branch, 866
F.3d 93 (3d Cir. 2017) (Chagares, J.) (vacated and remanded) (finding
reversible procedural defect under Federal Magistrate’s Act).
City Select Auto Sales Inc. v. BMW Bank of North America Inc., 867 F.3d
434 (3d Cir. 2017) (Scirica, J.) (vacated and remanded) (concluding
plaintiffs had adequately demonstrated Rule 23’s ascertainability require-
ment to merit class certification) (Fuentes, J. concurring) (critiquing
Third Circuit’s treatment of ascertainability requirement).
In re: Howmedica Osteonics Corp., 867 F.3d 390 (3d Cir. 2017) (Krause,
J.) (vacated and remanded) (creating a four-step approach to determine
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whether  in which the reviewing court, whether the District Court in the
first instance, or this Court on appeal, will consider in sequence: (1) the
forum-selection clauses, (2) the private and public interests relevant to
non-contracting parties, (3) threshold issues related to severance, and (4)
which transfer decision most promotes efficiency while minimizing
prejudice to non-contracting parties’ private interests).
In re Lipitor Antitrust Litigation, 855 F.3d 126 (3d Cir. 2017) (Fisher, J.)
(concluding jurisdiction appropriate in Third Circuit rather than Federal
Circuit because “patent law neither creates plaintiffs’ cause of action nor is
a necessary element to any of plaintiffs’ well-pleaded claims”).
Ramirez v. Vintage Pharmaceuticals, LLC, 852 F.3d 324 (3d Cir. 2017)
(Venaskie, J.) (reversed and remanded) (holding that the court properly
exercised jurisdiction under the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005).
Seneca Resources Corporation v. Township of Highland, 863 F.3d 245 (3d
Cir. 2017) (Smith, C.J.) (holding court did not abuse its discretion when
denying intervenors motion for reconsideration).
Mullin v. Balicki, 875 F.3d 140 (3d Cir. 2017) (Fuentes, J.) (affirmed
in part but reversing district court on grounds that it abused its discretion
in denying plaintiff leave to amend complaint).
Fahie v. Virgin Islands, 858 F.3d 162 (3d Cir. 2017) (Jordan, J.) (hold-
ing in part that the Third Circuit had jurisdiction to hear appeal from
Virgin Islands Supreme Court because of North America Seafarers Interna-
tional Union ex rel. Bason v. Government of the Virgin Islands, 767 F.3d 193,
205-06 (3d Cir. 2014) and it lacked power to overturn Bason absent en
banc review). Bason was ultimately overturned by Vooys v. Bentley, 901 F.3d
172 (3d Cir. 2018) when the court reconsidered the issue en banc.
Rarick v. Federated Service Insurance Company, 852 F.3d 223 (3d Cir.
2017) (Hardiman, J.) (issue of first impression) (holding that indepen-
dent claim test is the standard district courts should use to review a com-
plaint seeking both legal and declaratory relief).
Reilly v. City of Harrisburg, 858 F.3d 173 (3d Cir. 2017) (Ambro, J.)
(vacated and remanded) (clarifying preliminary injunction analysis by dis-
tinguishing between critical and gateway factors, and holding that first two
factors—reasonable probability of success and threat of irreparable
harm—are most important).
Susinno v. Work Out World Inc., 862 F.3d 346 (3d Cir. 2017)
(Hardiman, J.) (reversed district court’s dismissal of plaintiff’s claims for
lack of subject matter jurisdiction because the Telephone Consumer Pro-
tection Act “provides [plaintiff] with a cause of action, and her alleged
injury is concrete”).
Taha v. County of Bucks, 862 F.3d 292 (3d Cir. 2017) (Greenberg, J.)
(affirming district court’s motion for class certification because plaintiff
sufficiently alleged injury under Pennsylvania’s Criminal History Record
Information Act).
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In re Flonase Antitrust Litigation, 879 F.3d 61 (3d Cir. 2017) (Green-
away, J) (issue of first impression) (concluding that Eleventh Amendment
applies to class action settlements and held that because state of Louisiana
had not waived sovereign immunity, it was not bound by a class settlement
that prohibited class members from bringing separate suits against each
other).  A petition for certiorari has been docketed to the U.S. Supreme
Court.184
Commercial Law
Aliments Krispy Kernels, Inc. v. Nichols Farms, 851 F.3d 283 (3d Cir.
2017) (Fuentes, J.) (vacated and remanded) (applying New Jersey choice
of law rules to settle contract dispute and vacating district court’s grant of
summary judgment because factual issues precluded judgment as a matter
of law).
Finkelman v. National Football League, 877 F.3d 504 (3d Cir. 2017)
(Fuentes, J.) (reversing district court’s motion to dismiss and holding that
plaintiff had Article III standing to pursue claim against NFL and affiliated
entities for withholding more than 5% of seats to the Super Bowl in viola-
tion of New Jersey law).
James v. Global TelLink Corp., 852 F.3d 262 (3d Cir. 2017) (Hardiman,
J.) (affirming district court’s denial of motion to compel arbitration be-
cause appellees did not agree to be bound by the terms of use contained
on the defendant’s website and did not agree to arbitrate).
White v. Sunoco, Inc., 870 F.3d 257 (3d Cir. 2017) (Chagares, J.) (inter-
preting South Dakota and Florida law and holding that plaintiff could not
be forced to arbitrate under principles of equitable estoppel, affirming the
district court) (Roth J. dissenting) (opining that under terms of an inte-
grated contract, plaintiff could be forced to under basic contract interpre-
tation principles).
Corporate Law
Williams v. Globus Medical, Inc., 869 F.3d 235 (3d Cir. 2017) (Scirica,
J.) (affirming district court’s dismissal of claims alleged under the Securi-
ties Exchange Act).
Norman v. Elkin, 860 F.3d 111 (3d Cir. 2017) (Jordan, J.) (affirmed in
part, vacated in part, remanded) (concluding that district court “erred in
concluding that tolling of the statute of limitations is categorically inap-
propriate when a plaintiff has inquiry notice before initiating a books and
records action in the Delaware courts”).
184. 879 F.3d 61 (3d Cir. 2017), petition for cert. filed, 2018 WL 3361039 (U.S.
July 6, 2018) (No. 18-42).
26
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 63, Iss. 5 [2019], Art. 1
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol63/iss5/1
2018] THIRD CIRCUIT REVIEW 777
Federal Declaratory Judgment Actions
Kelly v. Maxum Specialty Insurance Group, 868 F.3d 274 (3d Cir. 2017)
(Chagares, J.) (reversed and remanded) (holding that when evaluating
parallel clams under the Declaratory Judgment Act, “the mere potential or
possibility that two proceedings will resolve related claims between the
same parties is not sufficient to make those proceedings parallel; rather,
there must be a substantial similarity in issues and parties between contem-
poraneously pending proceedings”).
Fair Debt Collection Practices
Daubert v. NRA Group, LLC, 861 F.3d 382 (3d Cir. 2017) (Fisher, J.)
(affirmed in part, reversed and remanded in part) (affirming district
court’s grant of summary judgment on Telephone Consumer Protection
Act claim and reversing grant of summary judgment on the Fair Debt Col-
lection Practices Act claim).
Education
H.E. v. Walter D. Palmer Leadership Learning Partners Charter School, 873
F.3d 406 (3d Cir. 2017) (Krause, J.) (reversed and remanded) (conclud-
ing that when plaintiff was a prevailing party under the individuals with
Disabilities Education Act, it was entitled to attorney’s fees).
Issa v. School District of Lancaster, 847 F.3d 121 (3d Cir. 2017) (Fisher,
J.) (issue of first impression) (holding that to allege a violation of the
Equal Educational Opportunities Act of 1974, 20 U.S.C. § 1703(f), an indi-
vidual “must satisfy four elements: (1) the defendant must be an educa-
tional agency, (2) the plaintiff must face language barriers impeding her
equal participation in the defendant’s instructional programs, (3) the de-
fendant must have failed to take appropriate action to overcome those
barriers, and (4) the plaintiff must have been denied equal educational
opportunity on account of her race, color, sex, or national origin”).
M.R. v. Ridley School District, 868 F.3d 218 (3d Cir. 2017) (Krause, J.)
(reversed and remanded) (issue of first impression) (holding that when a
plaintiff prevails under the “stay put” provision of the Individuals with Dis-
abilities Education Act (IDEA), a plaintiff may seek award of attorneys’
fees as the prevailing party).
Wellman v. Butler Area School District, 877 F.3d 125 (3d Cir. 2017)
(Shwartz, J.) (vacated and remanded) (concluding under Fry v. Napoleon
Community Schools, 137 S. Ct. 743 (2017), plaintiff did not exhaust adminis-
trative remedies prior to seeking relief under Individuals with Disabilities
Education Act” and accordingly dismissing complaint with prejudiced).
Election Law
American Civil Rights Union v. Philadelphia City Commissioners, 872 F.3d
175 (3d Cir. 2017) (McKee, J.) (affirmed) (dismissing plaintiff’s suit seek-
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ing to purge city voter rolls of convicted felons currently incarcerated be-
cause text o Section 8(a)(3) of the National Voter Registration Act “places
no affirmative obligations on states (or voting commissions) to remove vot-
ers from the rolls”).
Constitution Party of Pennsylvania v. Cortes, 877 F.3d 480 (3d Cir. 2017)
(Roth, J.) (vacated and remand) (explaining the district court erred by
granting injunctive relief when it “did not make any factual findings or
provide any explanation on the record of the factors it considered in de-
termining that its injunction was appropriate”).
Rodriquez v. 32nd Legislature of Virgin Islands, 859 F.3d 199 (3d Cir.
2017) (Shwartz, J.) (affirmed in part, dismissed in part) (declining to in-
tervene where Virgin Island law provided that legislature had sole author-
ity to determine whether senator-elect possessed requisite qualifications to
sit in the legislature).
Energy
Estate of Ware v. Hospital of the University of Pennsylvania, 871 F.3d 273
(3d Cir. 2017) (Ambro, J.) (affirmed) (clarifying reach of Price–Anderson
Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2011, et seq.)
McMunn v. Babcock & Wilcox Power Generation Group, Inc., 869 F.3d 246
(3d Cir. 2017) (Smith, C.J.) (affirming district court’s grant of summary
judgment to defendants on plaintiff’s excessive radiation claims under the
Price-Anderson Act).
Fair Housing Act
Revock v. Cowpet Bay West Condominium Association, 853 F.3d 96 (3d Cir.
2017) (Restrepo, J.) (reversed in part, vacated in part) (issue of first im-
pression) (holding “Fair Housing Act claims survive the death of a party”).
False Claims Act
United States ex rel. Petratos v. Genentech Inc., 855 F.3d 481 (3d Cir. 2017)
(Hardiman, J.) (affirmed) (joining Ninth Circuit to interpret U.S. Su-
preme Court’s decision in Universal Health Servs., Inc. v. United States ex rel.
Escobar, 136 S. Ct. 1989, 1996 (2016) and recognizing a “heightened mate-
riality standard” when investigating the four elements of a False Claims Act
violation).
United States ex rel. Spay v. CVS Caremark Corporation, 875 F.3d 746 (3d
Cir. 2017) (McKee, J.) (affirmed) (issue of first impression) (explaining
that there are  “there are two prongs to [the government inference] de-
fense: (1) the government knew about the alleged false statement(s), and
(2) the defendant knew that the government knew.”).
United States ex rel. Petras v. Simparel, Inc., 857 F.3d 497 (3d Cir. 2017)
(McKee, J.) (affirmed) (issue of first impression) (joining the Fifth and
Ninth Circuits to hold that the Small Busienss Administration, when acting
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as a receiver for a shareholder, does not act as the government, and may
not raise a claim under the False Claims Act).
International Child Abduction Remedies (ICARA)
Blackledge v. Blackledge, 866 F.3d 169 (3d Cir. 2017) (Krause, J.) (af-
firmed) (hold that in international custody action under ICARA, the “re-
tention date is the date beyond which the noncustodial parent no longer
consents to the child’s continued habitation with the custodial parent and
instead seeks to reassert custody rights, as clearly and unequivocally com-
municated through words, actions, or some combination thereof” and not-
ing that the inquiry is fact-sensitive).
Immigration
Alimbaev v. Attorney General of United States, 872 F.3d 188 (3d Cir. 2017)
(Krause, J.) (granting petition after Board of Immigration Appeals “misap-
plied the clearly erroneous standard in rejecting the [immigration
judge’s] finding that [the petitioner’s] testimony was credible).
Ildefonso-Candelario v. Attorney General of United States, 866 F.3d 102 (3d
Cir. 2017) (Stearns, J.) (issue of first impression) (applying the categorical
approach to conclude that Pennsylvania criminal statue involving a “mis-
demeanor count of obstructing the administration of law or other govern-
mental function” was not categorically a crime of moral turpitude).
Mendoza-Ordonez v. Attorney General of United States, 869 F.3d 164 (3d
Cir. 2017) (Nygaard, J.) (petition granted in part and denied in part)
(concluded case was “one of those rare instances” where withholding of
removal should be granted because of “evidence of the politically moti-
vated death threats, the inaction on [the plaintiff’s] complaints, a perpe-
trator and judge who shared a political affiliation in opposition to that of
[plaintiff], and evidence of a politically corrupt justice system that failed to
reign in politically motivated violence in Honduras” compels withholding
of removal).
Bamaca-Cifuentes v. Attorney General United States, 870 F.3d 108 (3d Cir.
2017) (McKee, J.) (petition for review denied) (holding that “procedural
requirements in 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c) apply with equal force to motions to
reopen removal proceedings involving protection under the CAT”).
Serrano-Alberto v. Attorney General United States, 859 F.3d 208 (3d Cir.
2017) (Krause, J.) (petition granted) (concluding “that the Immigration
Judge here denied Petitioner this fundamental right by actively preventing
him from making his case for asylum, withholding of removal, and protec-
tion under the Convention Against Torture (CAT)”).
Cazun v. Attorney General United States, 856 F.3d 249 (3d Cir. 2017)
(Rendell, J.) (affirmed) (holding that “aliens subject to reinstated removal
orders are ineligible to apply for asylum”) (Hardiman, J. concurring) (of-
fering different interpretation of statute but concurring in judgment)
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Flores v. Attorney General United States, 856 F.3d 280 (3d Cir. 2017)
(Fuentes, J.) (holding petitioner eligible for withholding of removal be-
cause “South Carolina accessory-after-the-fact conviction is not an offense
“relating to obstruction of justice,” it cannot be considered either an “ag-
gravated felony” or a “particularly serious crime” under the Immigration
and Nationality Act”) (Shwartz, J. concurring in part and dissenting in
part) (disagreeing with majority and opining “that South Carolina’s acces-
sory after the fact offense is related to obstruction of justice, and it there-
fore qualifies as an aggravated felony under 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(S)”).
Myrie v. Attorney General United States, 855 F.3d 509 (3d Cir. 2017) (Am-
bro, J.) (concluding Board of Immigration appeals erred by not reviewing
immigration judge’s conclusion de novo).
Chavez-Alvarez v. Attorney General United States, 850 F.3d 583 (3d Cir.
2017) (Ambro, J.) (holding that sodomy conviction “cannot survive as a
predicate ‘crime’ that triggers the pertinent removability provision of the
INA”).
Uddin v. Attorney General United States, 870 F.3d 282 (3d Cir. 2017)
(Rendell, J.) (holding that “unless the agency finds that party leaders au-
thorized terrorist activity committed by its members, an entity such as the
[Bangladesh National Party] cannot be deemed a Tier III terrorist organi-
zation”) (Greenaway, J. concurring) (joining the court’s opinion in full
but writing separately to “clarify and expand on the meaning and scope of
that holding and its necessary implications”).
Mateo v. Attorney General United States, 870 F.3d 228 (3d Cir. 2017)
(Vanaskie, J.) (issue of first impression) (joining the Sixth, Ninth, and
Eleventh circuits to hold that the definition of “crime of violence” under
18 U.S.C. § 16(b) is unconstitutionally vague for purposes of Immigration
and Nationality Act’s definition of an aggravated felony) .
Sang Goo Park v. Attorney General, 846 F.3d 645 (3d Cir. 2017) (Fuen-
tes, J.) (petition denied) (clarifying framework for “settled course” excep-
tion and holding that to invoke the exception “to [the court’s] rule
against review of orders denying sua sponte reopening requests, a peti-
tioner must establish that the [Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA)] has
limited its discretion via a policy, rule, settled course of adjudication, or by
some other method, such that the BIA’s discretion can be meaningfully
reviewed for abuse”).
Insurance
General Refractories Company v. First State Insurance Co., 855 F.3d 152 (3d
Cir. 2017) (Venaskie, J.) (reversed and remanded) (holding policy exclu-
sion that prevents recovery on losses “arising out of asbestos” was unambig-
uous and requires “but for” causation).
In re Trustees of Conneaut Lake Park, Inc., 855 F.3d 519 (3d Cir. 2017)
(Hardiman, J.) (reversed and remanded) (issue of first impression) (hold-
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ing the text of Section 638 of Pennsylvania’s Insurance Code statute re-
quired the “named insured” to pay delinquent taxes).
Intellectual Property
Covertech Fabricating, Inc. v. TVM Building Products, Inc., 855 F.3d 163
(3d Cir. 2017) (Krause, J.) (affirmed in part, vacated in part) (issue of first
impression) (holding “that as between a manufacturer and its exclusive
distributor, there is a rebuttable presumption of initial trademark owner-
ship in favor of the manufacturer, and that [six-factor McCarthy] test is
the proper analytical tool through which a distributor may attempt to re-
but that presumption in the absence of a contractual agreement”).
Parks LLC v. Tyson Foods, Inc, 863 F.3d 220 (3d Cir. 2017) (Jordan, J.)
(affirmed) (affirming district court’s dismissal of false advertising claim
and holding that geographic origin “must refer, at the very least, to the
place of the origin of goods”).
Labor and Employment
Karlo v. Pittsburgh Glass Works, LLC, 849 F.3d 61 (3d Cir. 2017) (Smith,
C.J.) (affirmed in part, vacated in part, remanded) (rejecting approach
adopted by Second, Sixth, and Eighth Circuits and concluding that under
the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, subgroups may allege dispa-
rate impact claims).
McGann v. Cinemark USA, Inc., 873 F.3d 218 (3d Cir. 2017) (Restrepo,
J.) (issue of first impression) (holding that the ADA’s requirement to pro-
vide “auxiliary aid or service” includes tactile interpreters at a movie
theater).
McNelis v. Pennsylvania Power & Light Company, 867 F.3d 411 (3d Cir.
2017) (Hardiman, J.) (affirmed) (affirming district court’s grant of sum-
mary judgment after analyzing regulations related to Americans with Disa-
bilities Act and the regulations promulgated by the Nuclear Regulatory
Commission).
National Labor Relations Board v. New Vista Nursing and Rehabilitation,
870 F.3d 113 (3d Cir. 2017) (Smith, C.J.) (remanded) (denying National
Labor Relations Board petition for enforcement after it applied wrong
standard to determine whether employer should have bargained with em-
ployee-nurses) (Greenaway, J. concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(opining that opinion of the court misreads and misapplies Third Circuit
precedent).
Sikora v. UPMC, 876 F.3d 110 (3d Cir. 2017) (Smith, C.J.) (affirmed)
(affirming district court’s grant of summary judgment after agreeing that
plaintiff’s plan was a “top hat” plan to which Employee Retirement In-
come Security Act (ERISA) did not apply).
Secretary United States Department of Labor v. Kwasny, 853 F.3d 87 (3d
Cir. 2017) (McKee, J.) (affirmed and remanded) (affirming grant of sum-
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mary judgment under ERISA because record showed no material issue of
disputed fact).
Trzaska v. L’Oreal USA, Inc., 865 F.3d 155 (3d Cir. 2017) (Ambro, J.)
(reversed and remanded) (reversing district court’s grant of motion to
dismiss claim under New Jersey Conscientious Employee Protection Act
(CEPA)) (Chagares, J. concurring in part and dissenting in part) (opining
plaintiff had not stated a plausible claim under CEPA).
Capps v. Mondelez Global, LLC, 847 F.3d 144 (3d Cir. 2017) (Restrepo,
J.) (affirmed) (affirming district court’s grant of summary judgment and
holding “that an employer’s honest belief that its employee was misusing
FMLA leave can defeat an FMLA retaliation claim”).
Helen Mining Company v. Elliott, 859 F.3d 226 (3d Cir. 2017) (Krause,
J.) (affirmed) (concluding that coal mine operators are subject to 20
C.F.R. § 718.305(d)(1) (2013)’s rebuttal standard “because the regulation
permissibly fills a statutory gap” in the Black Lung Benefits Act (BLBA), a
statute that “confers on coal workers generally the right to claim workers’
compensation benefits for disabilities arising out of coal dust exposure”).
Jones v. Does 1-10, 857 F.3d 508 (3d Cir. 2017) (Fuentes, J.) (affirmed)
(dismissing claims under Fair Labor Standards Act after holding that par-
ties should have submitted claims to arbitration first) (Ambro, J. dissent-
ing) (disagreeing that arbitration was necessary).
Castleberry v. STI Group, 863 F.3d 259 (3d Cir. 2017) (Ambro, J.) (re-
versed and remanded) (reversed district court’s dismissal of complaint
and holding that plaintiffs stated plausible claim of discrimination under
42 U.S.C. § 1981).
Moon v. Breathless Inc, 868 F.3d 209 (3d Cir. 2017) (Greenaway, J.)
(reversed and remanded) (holding that arbitration clause in a signed em-
ployment contract did not cover statutory claims).
Williams v. Pennsylvania Human Relations Commission, 870 F.3d 294 (3d
Cir. 2017) (Fuentes, J.) (affirmed) (holding that violations of Title VII and
the ADA may not be brought under § 1983).
Employer Trustees of Western Pennsylvania Teamsters v. Union Trustees of
Western Pennsylvania Teamsters, 870 F.3d 235 (3d Cir. 2017) (finding two
disputes within parties’ arbitration agreement and accordingly appointing
arbitrator to resolve them).
Dowling v. Pension Plan For Salaried Employees of Union Pacific Corporation
and Affiliates, 871 F.3d 239 (3d Cir. 2017) (Vanaskie, J.) (reversed and re-
manded) (interpreting retirement plan and concluding that “because the
plan’s terminology, silence, and structure render it ambiguous, the plan
accords the plan administrator discretion to interpret ambiguous plan
terms, and the mere existence of a conflict of interest is alone insufficient
to raise skepticism of the plan administrator’s decision, we will grant defer-
ence to the plan administrator and affirm”).
Souryavong v. Lackawanna County, 872 F.3d 122 (3d Cir. 2017) (Vanas-
kie, J.) (affirmed) (affirming district court’s grant of summary judgment
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because defendant’s failure to pay overtime was not willful under Fair La-
bor Standards Act).
Zuber v. Boscov’s, 871 F.3d 255 (3d Cir. 2017) (Greenaway, J.) (re-
versed and remanded) (holding that former employee did not waive right
“to assert claims under the Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, 29
U.S.C. § 2617 (“FMLA”), and Pennsylvania common law when [the former
employee signed a Compromise and Release Agreement to settle his work-
ers’ compensation claims”).
Secretary United States Department of Labor v. American Future Systems, Inc.,
873 F.3d 420 (3d Cir. 2017) (McKee, J.) (affirmed) (concluding that “Fair
Labor Standards Act does require employers to compensate employees for
all rest breaks of twenty minutes or less”).
Fallon v. Mercy Catholic Medical Center of Southeastern Pennsylvania, 877
F.3d 487 (3d Cir. 2017) (Roth, J.) (affirmed) (affirming district court’s
grant of summary judgment to defendant when plaintiff sued defendant
under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and argued that his termina-
tion—which resulted from his refusal to take a flu shot on religious
grounds—amounted to religious discrimination because while plaintiff’s
beliefs were “sincere and strongly held, were not religious in nature and,
therefore, not protected by Title VII”).
Maritime Law
Matter of Christopher Columbus, LLC, 872 F.3d 130 (3d Cir. 2017) (Sten-
gel, J.) (reversed and remanded)185 (holding that admiralty jurisdiction
appropriate because in negligence case, alleged incident occurred aboard
yacht that had sufficient potential to disrupt maritime commerce).
Trotter v. 7R Holdings LLC, 873 F.3d 435 (3d Cir. 2017) (Greenaway,
J.) (affirmed) (holding district court properly dismissed a plaintiff’s Jones
Act and maritime claims pursuant to forum non conveniens and holding that
“hold that the general presumption that “[t]he possibility of a change in
substantive law should ordinarily not be given conclusive or even substan-
tial weight in the forum non conveniens inquiry”).
Joyce v. Maersk Line Ltd, 876 F.3d 502 (3d Cir. 2017) (Jordan, J.) (af-
firmed) (overruling Barnes v. Andover Co., L.P., 900 F.2d 630 (3d Cir.
1990) to hold that “ a union contract freely entered by a seafarer—a con-
tract that includes rates of maintenance, cure, and unearned wages—will
not be reviewed piecemeal by courts unless there is evidence of unfairness
in the collective bargaining process”).
Products Liability
In re Fosamax (Alendronate Sodium) Products Liability Litigation, 852 F.3d
268 (3d Cir. 2017) (Fuentes, J.) (vacated and remanded) (clarifying appli-
185. Lawrence F. Stengel, Chief District Judge for the United States District
Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, sat by designation.
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cation Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555 (2009), which “holds that state-law
failure-to-warn claims are preempted when there is ‘clear evidence’ that
the FDA would not have approved the warning that a plaintiff claims was
necessary” by concluding that “clear evidence” is a standard of proof).
In re Zoloft (Sertraline Hydrochloride) Products Liability Litigation, 858 F.3d
787 (3d Cir. 2017) (Roth, J.) (affirming district court’s grant of summary
judgment after finding it did not abuse its discretion in making various
evidentiary rulings).
In re: Asbestos Products Liability Litigation, 873 F.3d 232 (3d Cir. 2017),
cert granted, 138 S. Ct. 1990 (2018) (Vanaskie, J.) (issue of first impres-
sion) (splitting with the Sixth Circuit and at least one district court to hold
that that a manufacturer could be liable if the asbestos related injury was a
“reasonably foreseeable result of the manufacturer’s actions” in the con-
text of a negligence claim).
Homeowner’s Protection Act
Fried v. JP Morgan Chase & Co., 850 F.3d 590 (3d Cir. 2017) (Ambro,
J.) (affirmed, remanded) (holding that under the Homeowners Protec-
tion Act, 12 U.S.C. § 4901, a mortgage servicer may not recalculate the
length of the mortgage, and rather, the “end of the mortgage remains tied
to the initial purchase price of the home”).
Tax
Duquesne Light Holdings, Inc. & Subsidiaries v. Commissioner of Internal
Revenue, 861 F.3d 396 (3d Cir. 2017) (Ambro, J.) (affirmed) (concluding
that the tax court properly applied the Ilfeld doctrine to grant summary
judgement to the Internal Revenue Service) (Hardiman, J. dissenting).
Hassen v. Government of Virgin Islands, 861 F.3d 108 (3d Cir. 2017)
(Shwartz, J.) (abrogating Venen v. United States, 38 F.3d 100 (3d Cir. 1994)
and explaining that to recover damages for unauthorized tax collection, a
provision requiring the exhaustion of administrative remedies prior to
bringing such a claim is not jurisdictional).
Rubel v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 856 F.3d 301 (3d Cir. 2017)
(Shwartz, J.) (holding 90-day deadline for certain tax filing was jurisdic-
tional question).
United States v. Cardaci, 856 F.3d 267 (3d Cir. 2017) (Jordan, J.) (hold-
ing that marital home constituted property under federal tax lien statute,
26 U.S.C.A. § 6321).
Title VII
Carvalho–Grevious v. Delaware State University, 851 F.3d 249 (3d Cir.
2017) (Fisher, J.) (affirmed in part, reversed in part) (issue of first impres-
sion) (joining the Fourth Circuit to hold that in a Title VII employer retal-
iation claim a plaintiff need not establish but-for causation in prima facie
case).
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Moody v. Atlantic City Board of Education, 870 F.3d 206 (3d Cir. 2017)
(Shwartz, J.) (holding district court erred in concluding individual was not
plaintiff’s supervisor for purposes of a sexual harassment claim) (Rendell,
J. concurring in part and dissenting in part) (opining that Supreme
Court’s decision in Vance v. Ball State Univ., 133 S. Ct. 2434, 2442 (2013)
precludes finding that the individual was plaintiff’s supervisor).
Title IX
Doe v. Mercy Catholic Medical Center, 850 F.3d 545 (3d Cir. 2017)
(Fisher, J.) (affirmed in part, reversed in part) (holding that “a program
or activity under § 1687 is an education program or activity under
§ 1681(a) if it has features such that one could reasonably consider its
mission to be, at least in part, educational” and that “a private quid pro
quo claim exists for employees of federally-funded education programs
under Title IX”).
Transportation
In re Vehicle Carrier Services, 846 F.3d 71 (3d Cir. 2017) (Shwartz, J.)
(holding Shipping Act of 1984 preempted state consumer protection and
unjust enrichment claims and barred certain Clayton Act claims).
Norfolk Southern Railway Company v. Pittsburgh & West Virginia Railroad,
870 F.3d 244 (3d Cir. 2017) (Vanaskie, J.) (evaluating conflict between
lessor and lessees and affirming on various grounds).
Government Contracting
Alpha Painting & Construction Co. Inc. v. Delaware River Port Authority of
Pennsylvania and New Jersey, 853 F.3d 671 (3d Cir. 2017) (Rendell, J.) (af-
firmed in part, vacated in part) (holding district court did not abuse its
discretion by setting aside agency procurement decision because award
was “illegal and irrational” under Coco Bros. Inc. v. Pierce, 741 F.2d 675, 679
(3d Cir. 1984) but vacated in part by remanding to district court to “fash-
ion a more limited injunction”).
Section 1983 – First Amendment
De Ritis v. McGarrigle, 861 F.3d 444 (3d Cir. 2017) (Krause, J.) (re-
versed and remanded) (concluding that First Amendment did not protect
“statements made while performing official job responsibilities, speculative
comments about the reason for a perceived demotion, and recklessly false
rumors circulated to government officials” and accordingly dismissed First
Amendment retaliation claim under § 1983).
Mirabella v. Villard, 853 F.3d 641 (3d Cir. 2017) (Restrepo, J.) (re-
versed) (reversing district court and granting motion to dismiss because
sending “no contact” e-mail was not clearly established as First Amend-
ment violation).
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Wisniewski v. Fisher, 857 F.3d 152 (3d Cir. 2017) (Vanaskie, J.) (revers-
ing district court’s grant of motion to dismiss because inmate successfully
alleged First Amendment claim under § 1983, creating a narrow exception
under to rule that there is no First Amendment right to provide legal assis-
tance to inmates).
Fields v. City of Philadelphia, 862 F.3d 353 (3d Cir. 2017) (Ambro, J.)
(reversed and remanded) (issue of first impression) (concurring with the
First, Fifth, Seventh, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits in holding that “First
Amendment protects the act of photographing, filming, or otherwise re-
cording police officers conducting their official duties in public”)
(Nygarrd, J., filed separate opinion concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
Section 1983 – Bivens
Vanderklok v. United States, 868 F.3d 189 (3d Cir. 2017) (Jordan, J.)
(reversed in part, remanded, appeal dismissed in part) (issue of first im-
pression) (holding that “Bivens does not afford a remedy against airport
security screeners who allegedly retaliate against a traveler who exercises
First Amendment rights.”).
Section 1983 – Eighth Amendment
Wharton v. Danberg, 854 F.3d 234 (3d Cir. 2017) (Greenaway, J.) (af-
firming grant of summary judgment to prison officials because no evi-
dence demonstrated that failing to release prisoners timely did not
amount to deliberate indifference under the Eighth Amednment).
In Pearson v. Prison Health Service, 850 F.3d 526 (3d Cir. 2017) (Fisher,
J.) (issue of first impression) (affirming in part and reversing in part)
(holding that medical expert testimony may be necessary in some Eight
Amendment adequacy of care claims but concluding that prisoner did not
need to produce expert evidence to survive summary judgment on his ade-
quacy of care claims or on his delayed or denied medical treatment
claims).
Palakovic v. Wetzel, 854 F.3d 209 (3d Cir. 2017) (Smith, C.J.) (clarify-
ing Circuit precedent to hold that “the vulnerability to suicide framework”
established in prior cases applies “when a plaintiff seeks to hold prison
officials accountable for failing to prevent a prison suicide” but does not
“preclude other types of claims, even if those claims also relate to an indi-
vidual who committed suicide while in prison”).
Section 1983 –  False Arrest, Malicious Prosecution
Andrews v. Scuilli, 853 F.3d 690 (3d Cir. 2017) (Nygard, J.) (reversing
district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of defendants on
plaintiff’s false arrest and malicious prosecution claims because district
court erred in awarding defendants qualified immunity).
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Zimmerman v. Corbett, 873 F.3d 414 (3d Cir. 2017), cert denied, 138 S. Ct.
2623 (2018) (McKee, J.) (reversing district court for denying judgment on
the pleadings because plaintiff could not establish prima facie case of mali-
cious prosecution).
Section 1983 – Fourteenth Amendment
Allen v. DeBello, 861 F.3d 433 (3d Cir. 2017) (Fuentes, J) (affirming
district court that state court judges when acting in an adjudicatory rather
than enforcement capacity were not proper defendants under § 1983).
Borrell v. Bloomsburg University, 870 F.3d 154 (3d Cir. 2017)
(Hardiman, J.) (concluding program director of a joint partnership be-
tween a public university and private hospital was state actor for liability
purposes under § 1983) (Roth, J. concurring in part) (opining plaintiff
received process due to her and accordingly defendants were not liable
under § 1983).
Kedra v. Schroeter, 876 F.3d 424 (3d Cir. 2017) (Krause, J.) (reversing
district court’s dismissal of § 1983 due process claim on qualified immu-
nity grounds, finding law clearly established “an individual’s right not to
be subjected, defenseless, to a police officer’s demonstration of the use of
deadly force in a manner contrary to all applicable safety protocols.”)
(Fisher, J. concurring) (stating he would define the clearly established
right more narrowly, as “as: a police officer’s right not to be subjected to a
firearms training in which the instructor acts with deliberate indifference,
that is, consciously disregards a known risk of death or great bodily
harm.”).
Steele v. Cicchi, 855 F.3d 494 (3d Cir. 2017) (Restrepo, J) (affirmed)
(issue of first impression) (joining Tenth and Eleventh Circuits by holding
detainee had protected liberty interest in exercising bail option once bail
was set).
Davenport v. Borough of Homestead, 870 F.3d 273 (3d Cir. 2017) (Fisher,
J.) (issue of first impression) (joining the “the majority of circuits in hold-
ing that a passenger shot by an officer during the course of a vehicular
pursuit may seek relief under the Fourth Amendment” and thus the claim
should not be analyzed under “the more generalized notion of ‘substan-
tive due process’ protected by the Fourteenth Amendment”).
Section 1983 – Qualified Immunity
Barna v. Board of School Directors of Panther Valley School District, 877 F.3d
136 (3d Cir. 2017) (Chagares, J.) (affirmed in part, vacated in part, re-
manded) (holding that right “right to participate in school board meet-
ings despite engaging in a pattern of threatening and disruptive behavior”
was not clearly established and accordingly awarded qualified immunity to
defendants).
Mann v. Palmerton Area School District, 872 F.3d 165 (3d Cir. 2017)
(Vanaskie, J.) (affirmed) (holding right “to be free from deliberate expo-
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sure to a traumatic brain injury after exhibiting signs of a concussion in
the context of a violent contact sport” was not clearly established for pur-
poses of § 1983 liability and accordingly awarding defendant qualified
immunity).
Williams v. Secretary Pennsylvania Department of Corrections, 848 F.3d 549
(3d Cir. 2017) (McKee, J.) (issue of first impression) (affirming district
court’s grant of summary judgment to prison officials but finding prison-
ers have clearly established right to avoid prolonged solitary detention on
death row).
Standing
Cottrell v. Alcon Laboratories, 874 F.3d 154 (3d Cir. 2017) (Restrepo, J.)
(reversing district court’s dismissal of class action alleging violation of con-
sumer protection statutes because plaintiffs had standing) (Roth, J. dis-
senting) (opining that plaintiffs’ injury too speculative to confer
standing).
In re Horizon Healthcare Services Inc. Data Breach Litigation, 846 F.3d 625
(3d Cir. 2017) (Jordan, J.) (vacated and remanded) (explaining that “vio-
lation of Fair Credit Reporting Act (“FCRA”), 15 U.S.C. § 1681, et seq.,
gives rise to an injury sufficient for Article III standing purposes”)
(Shwartz, J. concurring in judgment) (agreeing that plaintiffs have stand-
ings but under alternate theory).
Knick v. Township of Scott, 862 F.3d 310 (3d Cir. 2017) (Smith, J.)
(holding plaintiff lacked constitutional standing to pursue Fourth and
Fifth Amendment claims).  The U.S. Supreme Court has granted certio-
rari in this case to determine whether the Court should reconsider the
portion of Williamson County Regional Planning Commission v. Hamilton
Bank, 473 U.S. 172, 194-96 (1985) that requires “property owners to ex-
haust state court remedies to ripen federal takings claims.”186
Marathon Petroleum Corporation v. Secretary of Finance for Delaware, 876
F.3d 481 (3d Cir. 2017) (Jordan, J.) (vacated and remanded) (reversing
district court’s grant of motion to dismiss action against Delaware state
officials involving escheat disputes because company had standing).
Plains All American Pipeline L.P. v. Cook, 866 F.3d 534 (3d Cir. 2017)
(Fisher, J.) (affirmed in part, reversed in part) (reversing district court’s
grant of motion to dismiss procedural due process claim under Delaware
escheats law because of ripeness issues).
186. Knick v. Twp. of Scott, 138 S. Ct. 1262 (2018). See Arrigoni Enterprises,
LLC v. Town of Durham, 136 S. Ct. 1409 (2016) (Thomas, J., joined by Kennedy,
J., dissenting from denial of certiorari); San Remo Hotel, L.P. v. City and County of
San Francisco, 545 U.S. 323, 348 (2005) (Rehnquist, C.J., joined by O’Connor,
Kennedy, and Thomas, JJ., concurring in judgment).
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United States Housing Act
Hayes v. Harvey, 874 F.3d 98 (3d Cir. 2017) (Fisher, J.) (Greenaway, J.
dissenting) (holding that United States Housing Act of 1937’s enhanced
voucher provision, 42 U.S.C. § 1437f(t) did not create an enforceable
“right to remain in their unit as long as it is offered for rental housing”).
This decision was later vacated in 2018 in Hayes v. Harvey, 903 F.3d 32 (3d
Cir. 2018).
CRIMINAL MATTERS
Issues of First Impression
FEDERAL HABEAS PETITIONS & CROSS-APPEAL JURISDICTION – In Mathias
v. Frackville SCI,187 the Third Circuit joined the D.C., Second, and Ninth
Circuits to hold that Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a)(3) is not
jurisdictional.188  It also established the factors under which a court may
determine whether waiver of Rule 4(a)(3) is appropriate in the interests of
justice.  Those factors in include, “whether the issues substantially overlap
such that severance may be inefficient or create an absurd result; whether
good reason exists for the delay in filing; and whether there are extenuat-
ing circumstances present in the case that otherwise warrant relief.”189  Fi-
nally, the court held that a Certificate of Appeal is “mandatory for a
petitioner seeking to take a cross-appeal.”190  Judge Krause wrote on be-
half of Judge Fisher and Judge Melloy.
FORFEITURE – In United States v. Gjeli,191 the Third Circuit evaluated
whether defendants could be held jointly and severally liable under a
criminal forfeiture statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1963, and a civil forfeiture stat-
ute, 18 U.S.C. § 981(a)(1)(C).192  Judge Jordan, writing on behalf of
Judge Krause and Judge Stearns,193 concluded that the U.S. Supreme
Court’s decision in Honeycutt v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 1626 (2017) an-
swered this question in the negative, and that “[f]orfeiture . . . is limited to
property [each] defendant himself actually acquired as the result of the
crime.”194  The court concluded that Honeycutt effectively overruled the
Third Circuit’s prior decision in United States v. Pitt.195
187. 876 F.3d 462 (3d Cir. 2017) (Krause, J.), amending and superseding, 869
F.3d 175 (reversed in part and appeal dismissed in part).
188. Id. at 472.
189. Id. at 472–73.
190. Id. at 474.
191. 867 F.3d 418 (3d Cir. 2017) (Jordan, J.) (affirmed in part, vacated in
part, remanded).
192. Id. at 427.
193. Honorable Richard G. Stearns, United States District Court Judge for the
District of Massachusetts, sat by designation.
194. Id. at 428.
195. 193 F.3d 751 (3d Cir. 1999).
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HABEAS – SENTENCING ERROR – In Gardner v. Warden Lewisburg USP,196
the Third Circuit held that 28 U.S.C. § 2255 is an “adequate and effective
means to adjudicate a claim of sentencing error” under Alleyne v. United
States, 133 S. Ct. 2151, (2013).197  Judge Hardiman writing on behalf of
Judge McKee and Judge Rendell also held that Alleyne claims may not be
brought under 28 U.S.C. § 2241, the general habeas statute.198
HABEAS – PERJURED TESTIMONY – In Haskell v. Superintendent Greene
SCI,199 the Third Circuit evaluated a habeas petition under § 2254 that
alleged the defendant’s conviction was tainted by perjured testimony.200
The Third Circuit had to determine under which standard to evaluate the
harm the defendant incurred.  Rejecting the positions taken by the First,
Sixth, Eight, and Eleventh Circuits and joining the Ninth, Judge Ambro,
writing for Judge Vanaskie and Restrepo, held that “the actual-prejudice
standard of Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 637–38 (1993) does not
apply to claims on habeas that the state has knowingly presented or know-
ingly failed to correct perjured testimony” and “a reasonable likelihood
that the perjured testimony affected the judgment of the jury is all that is
required.”201
HABEAS – SECOND OR SUCCESSIVE PETITIONS – In In re Hoffner,202 the
Third Circuit evaluated what “is required for a claim to ‘rel[y]’ on a quali-
fying new rule” to satisfy the requirements of § 2255(h)(2),” which allows
habeas petitioners to file second or successive habeas petitions.203  Judge
Restrepo, writing on behalf of Judge McKee and Judge Ambro, held that
“whether a claim ‘relies’ on a qualifying new rule must be construed per-
missively and flexibly on a case-by-case basis.”204  The court joined the Sec-
ond, Sixth, Fourth and Tenth Circuits to authorize second or successive
habeas petitions that challenge the Armed Career Criminal Act’s (ACCA)
residual clause in light of Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015),
which held ACCA’s residual clause to be unconstitutionally vague.205
INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL – In McKernan v. Superintendent
Smithfield SCI,206  the Third Circuit instructed the district court to grant a
defendant’s habeas petition after concluding that when counsel for defen-
dant failed to recognize the judge’s lack of impartiality, that failure consti-
tuted ineffective assistance of counsel.207  Writing on behalf of Judge
196. 845 F.3d 99 (3d Cir. 2017) (Hardiman, J.).
197. Id. at 100.
198. Id. at 101–02.
199. 866 F.3d 139 (3d Cir. 2017) (Ambro, J.) (reversed).
200. Id. at 142.
201. Id. at 152.
202. 870 F.3d 301 (3d Cir. 2017) (Restrepo, J.).
203. Id. at 308.
204. Id. at 308.
205. Id. at 312.
206. 849 F.3d 557 (3d Cir. 2017) (Roth, J.) (reversed and remanded).
207. Id. at 559–60.
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Fisher and Greenaway, Judge Roth also held that the “right to an impartial
trial extends to a bench trial, and that such right cannot be waived by a
defendant.”208  Judge Roth reasoned that “considering the myriad proce-
dural safeguards in place to avoid the seating of even one biased juror, out
of twelve, it is inconceivable that, during a bench trial when the judge is
the sole factfinder, a trial may proceed when that judge is biased.”209
SENTENCING – CATEGORICAL APPROACH – ROBBERY – In United States v.
Graves,210 the Third Circuit determined whether a defendant’s state rob-
bery conviction served as a predicate offense for his designation as a ca-
reer offender under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1.211  Writing on behalf of Judge
Hardiman and Judge Fisher, Judge Roth joined the Seventh and Eleventh
Circuits to “hold that generic robbery requires no more than de
minimis force.”212  The Court also agreed with the Sixth and Ninth Circuit
to hold that “the most important factor in defining the generic version of
an offense is the approach of the majority of state statutes defining the
crime.”213  Accordingly, for sentencing purposes, the court concluded that
“generic federal robbery is defined as it is in the majority of state robbery
statutes, without the requirement of more than de minimis force.”214
SENTENCING – CATEGORICAL APPROACH – BURGLARY – The U.S. Su-
preme Court on a “grant, vacate, and remand” order instructed the Third
Circuit to take up United States v. Steiner215 and determine whether the
defendant’s predicate offense—a Pennsylvania burglary conviction—was a
“violent felon[y] under the Armed Career Criminal Act, 18 U.S.C.
§ 924(e).”216  Judge Fuentes, writing on behalf of Judges Jordan and
Vanaskie, concluded that under the categorical approach, “a conviction
under the Pennsylvania burglary statute in question is not a predicate
§ 4B1.2 ‘crime of violence’ and accordingly should not have been used to
“enhance [the defendant’s] sentence.”217
SENTENCING – SUBSTANTIAL FINANCIAL HARDSHIP – In United States v.
Poulson,218 the Third Circuit joined the Seventh and Eighth Circuits to
find that “substantial financial hardship” component of the sentencing en-
hancement in U.S.S.G. § 2B.1.1(b)(2)(A)–(C) is “subject to the usual—
and significant—degree of discretion afforded a district court during sen-
tencing.”  Writing on behalf of Judge McKee and Vanaskie, Judge Rendell
208. Id. at 565.
209. Id.
210. 877 F.3d 494 (3d Cir. 2017) (Roth, J.).
211. Id. at 500–01.
212. Id. at 503.
213. Id. at 504.
214. Id.
215. 847 F.3d 103 (3d Cir. 2017) (Fuentes, J.) (affirmed in part, vacated in
part, remanded).
216. Id. at 117.
217. Id. at 120.
218. 871 F.3d 261 (3d Cir. 2017) (Rendell, J.).
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reasoned because the sentencing enhancement requires an individualized
assessment, “ ‘substantial financial hardship’ is measured on a sliding scale
that is also fairly subjective.”219
SENTENCING – SUFFICIENTLY ANALOGOUS OFFENSES – In United States v.
Jackson,220 the Third Circuit considered how a district court, pursuant to
U.S.S.G. § 2X5.1, should sentence a convicted felon when no guideline
has been promulgated as to the defendant’s offense.221  In those circum-
stances, district courts should apply the guideline offense “most analo-
gous” to that which the defendant committed.222  The court joined the
Fifth, Eighth, and Tenth circuits to adopt an “elements-based approach,”
which “calls for a comparison between the elements of the offense of con-
viction with the purportedly analogous offense guideline and the elements
of the various federal offenses covered by this guideline.”223  Judge
Cowen, joined by Judge Fuentes, then remanded the case for resentencing
after concluding the district court erred in determining what constituted a
sufficiently analogous offense.224  Judge McKee dissented, arguing that
the district court’s sentences were appropriate.225
SENTENCING – CALCULATING GUIDELINE RANGE – In United States v.
Martin,226 the Third Circuit considered whether the appropriate guideline
range under which to sentence a defendant is the agreed-upon guideline
range in a plea agreement.227  Judge Hardiman, writing on behalf of
Judge Fisher and Judge Roth, joined the Second and Ninth Circuits in
concluding that the appropriate range is that which is established by the
court.228  Thus, even if the government and the defendant stipulate to a
lower guideline range—e.g., the lowered drug guidelines—that agree-
ment does not preclude the court from setting the guideline range at ca-
reer offender levels.229
SENTENCING – INTERVENING ARRESTS –  In United States v. Ley,230 the
Third Circuit interpreted what constitutes  an “intervening arrest” when
calculating a defendant’s criminal history under the Sentencing Guide-
lines.231  Judge Fisher, on behalf of Judge Hardiman and Judge Roth, held
that under U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2(a)(2), “an arrest is a formal, custodial ar-
rest.”232  The court joined the Sixth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits in mak-
219. Id. at 268.
220. 862 F.3d 365 (3d Cir. 2017) (Cowen, J.) (McKee, dissenting).
221. Id. at 372.
222. Id.
223. Id. at 371.
224. Id. at 394.
225. Id. at 415.
226. 867 F.3d 428 (3d Cir. 2017) (Hardiman, J.) (affirmed).
227. Id. at 429.
228. Id. at 432.
229. Id. at 433.
230. 876 F.3d 103 (3d Cir. 2017) (Fisher, J.) (vacated and remanded).
231. Id. at 106.
232. Id. at 109.
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ing such a determination, and split with the Seventh Circuit.233  The
Seventh Circuit has held that traffic stops constitute arrests for sentencing
purposes.234
SUPERVISED RELEASE – In United States v. Johnson,235 the Third Circuit
considered whether one court’s revocation of supervised release may ter-
minate supervised release for a separate conviction.236  Judge Fuentes,
writing for Judge Greenaway and Judge Shwartz, answered this question in
the negative, and the court joined the Second and Fifth Circuits to “re-
ject[ ] the model of merged terms of supervised release.”237
En Banc
SENTENCING – ABUSED  POSITION OF PUBLIC TRUST – In United States v.
Douglas,238 the Third Circuit considered whether an airport employee
convicted of using his security clearance to smuggle drugs was subject to
the two-level sentencing enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 3B1.3 because he
“abused a position of public or private trust.”239  Although the Third Cir-
cuit at first concluded that the defendant was subject to the enhancement,
the court vacated its judgment when the court reheard the case en banc,
and set established new parameters to determine whether the two-level
sentencing enhancement applies to future cases.240  The court followed
an approach previously taken by the Seventh Circuit.241
Split Decisions
FOURTH AMENDMENT – CELL PHONE LOCATION DATA – In United States
v. Stimler,242 the Third Circuit considered, among other issues raised by
defendants, whether the district court should have excluded historical cell
site location information evidence (CSLI) used by the government.243
Writing on behalf of Judge Chagares and Judge Restrepo, Judge Roth ex-
plained that the third-party doctrine, which removes the cloak of privacy
233. Id.
234. Id.  (citing United States v. Morgan, 354 F.3d 621, 623–24 (7th Cir.
2003)).
235. 861 F.3d 474 (3d Cir. 2017) (Fuentes, J.) (affirmed).
236. Id. at 476–79.
237. Id. at 478.
238. 849 F.3d 40 (3d Cir. 2017), rev’d and remanded after hearing en banc,
885 F.3d 124 (3d Cir. 2018).
239. Douglas, 849 F.3d at 47.
240. United States v. Douglas, 885 F.3d 124 (3d Cir. 2018).
241. Id. at 197–98 (citing United States v. Davis, 793 F.3d 712 (7th Cir.
2015) (en banc)).
242. 864 F.3d 253 (3d Cir. 2017) (Roth, J) (affirmed) (Restrepo, J.) (concur-
ring in part and concurring in the judgment), reh’g granted, United States v. Gold-
stein, 902 F.3d 411 (3d Cir. 2018) (Mem) (ordering parties to provide
supplemental briefing in light of Supreme Court’s decision in Carpenter v. United
States, 138 S. Ct. 2206 (2018)).
243. Id. at 261.
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on individual’s private data when shared with a third-party, does not apply
to CSLI “because cell phone users do not voluntarily disclose CSLI to their
service providers simply by signing a service contract.”244  Nevertheless,
the court held that under Supreme Court and Third Circuit precedent,
“the Fourth Amendment is not violated when the government has shown
‘reasonable grounds to believe that the . . . records [including CSLI
data] . . . are relevant and material to an ongoing criminal
investigation.’”245
Judge Restrepo wrote a separate opinion to concur in part and con-
cur in the judgment.  In sum, he disagreed with the court’s opinion that a
Fourth Amendment Violation did not occur.  According to Judge
Restrepo, “the Government obtaining 57 days of aggregated CSLI with
only a § 2703(d) order supported by reasonable suspicion is, in this case, a
warrantless search that violates the Fourth Amendment.”246
In 2018, the court granted a petition for a panel rehearing247 in light
of Supreme Court’s decision in Carpenter v. United States.248  In Carpenter,
the Supreme Court held that “an individual maintains a legitimate expec-
tation of privacy in the record of his physical movements as captured
through CSLI.”249
MOTION FOR DISCOVERY – CLAIM OF UNCONSTITUTIONAL SELECTIVE EN-
FORCEMENT – In United States v. Washington,250 the defendant appealed the
district court’s denial of the defendant’s motion for pretrial discovery
based on a selective enforcement or prosecution claim.251  The Third Cir-
cuit concluded that the district court erred in applying too strict a stan-
dard in denying the defendant’s motion.252  Writing on behalf of Judge
McKee and Judge Cowen, Judge Fuentes held that district courts may
adopt a more flexible approach to determine whether claims of selective
law enforcement necessitate pretrial discovery.253  Judge McKee wrote a
separate opinion concurring in the majority’s ruling on the defendant’s
selective enforcement claim, but dissenting on another aspect of the de-
fendant’s sentencing claim because of the unique circumstances of the
case.254
244. Id. at 262–64.
245. Id. at 266–67.
246. Id. at 175.
247. United States v. Goldstein, 902 F.3d 411 (3d Cir. 2018) (Mem).
248. 138 S. Ct. 2206 (2018).
249. Id. at 2217.
250. 869 F.3d 193 (3d Cir. 2017) (Fuentes, J.) (McKee, J. dissenting).
251. Id. at 213.
252. Id. at 213, 220.
253. Id. at 220–21.
254. Id. at 223–34.
44
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 63, Iss. 5 [2019], Art. 1
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol63/iss5/1
2018] THIRD CIRCUIT REVIEW 795
PRISONER LITIGATION REFORM ACT – IN FORMA PAUPERIS – In Millhouse
v. Heath,255 the Third Circuit evaluated whether a prisoner was entitled to
proceed in forma pauperis for the purposes of his appeal.256  Judge Co-
hen, writing on behalf of Judge Ambro and Judge Restrepo, stated that to
evaluate in forma pauperis status, the court “must look to the date the
notice of appeal is filed—and not the date that the Court rules on a pris-
oner’s motion to proceed IFP—in assessing whether a particular dismissal
counts as a strike.  In short, strikes that accrue before the filing of the
notice of appeal count—while strikes that accrue after the notice of appeal
is filed do not.”257  Judge Ambro wrote separately “to disagree with [his]
colleagues’’ interpretation of the Prisoner Litigation Reform Act
(“PLRA”) and their conclusion that Heath II does not count as a strike”
and to “agree that [the plaintiff] only has one strike for the purpose of this
appeal and thus his case should be remanded.”258
SENTENCING – CRIME OF VIOLENCE – In United States v. Chapman,259 the
Third Circuit considered whether a defendant’s prior conviction under 18
U.S.C. § 876(c)—“which proscribes mailing a communication containing
a threat to injure the person of the addressee or of another—is a crime of
violence that merits the career offender sentencing enhancement under
the sentencing guidelines.”260  Judge Greenaway, writing on behalf of
Judge Jordan and Judge Rendell, applied the categorical approach and
concluded that it was.261  Judge Jordan concurred with the opinion, but
wrote separately to express his “dismay at the ever-expanding application
of the categorical approach.”262
SENTENCING – SUFFICIENTLY ANALOGOUS OFFENSES – In United States v.
Jackson,263 the Third Circuit considered how a district court, pursuant to
U.S.S.G. § 2X5.1, should sentence a convicted felon when no guideline
has been promulgated as to the defendant’s offense.264  In those circum-
stances, district courts should apply the guideline offense “most analo-
gous” to that which the defendant committed.265  The court joined the
Fifth, Eighth, and Tenth circuits to adopt an “elements-based approach,”
which “calls for a comparison between the elements of the offense of con-
viction with the purportedly analogous offense guideline and the elements
255. 866 F.3d 152 (3d Cir. 2017) (Cowen, J.) (Ambro, J. dissenting in part
and concurring in the judgment).
256. Id. at 153–54.
257. Id. at 154.
258. Id. at 164–65.
259. 866 F.3d 129 (3d Cir. 2017) (Greenaway, J.) (Jordan, J. concurring)
(affirmed).
260. Id. at 130.
261. Id. at 133–36.
262. Id. at 136.
263. 862 F.3d 365 (3d Cir. 2017) (Cowen, J.) (McKee, dissenting).
264. Id. at 372.
265. Id.
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of the various federal offenses covered by this guideline.”266  Judge
Cowen, joined by Judge Fuentes, then remanded the case for resentencing
after concluding the district court erred in determining what constituted a
sufficiently analogous offense.267  Judge McKee dissented, arguing that
the district court’s sentences were appropriate.268
Appendix of Precedential Criminal Opinions
Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act
Coleman v. Greene, 845 F.3d 73 (3d Cir. 2017) (Hardiman, J.) (af-
firmed) (declining to hear habeas petition beyond one-year statute of limi-
tations when defendant could not satisfy the “actual innocence
requirement of the fundamental miscarriage of justice exception to
AEDPA”).
Appellate Procedure
Mathias v. Superintendent Frackville SCI, 876 F.3d 462 (3d Cir. 2017)
(Krause, J.) (reversed in part; appeal dismissed in part) (issue of first im-
pression) (holding Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a)(3) is not ju-
risdictional, establishing factors under which a court may determine
whether waiver of Rule 4(a)(3) is appropriate in the interests of justice,
and holding that a Certificate of Appeal is “mandatory for a petitioner
seeking to take a cross-appeal.”).
Contempt
United States v. Apple MacPro Computer, 851 F.3d 238 (3d Cir. 2017)
(Vanaski, J.), cert denied, 138 S. Ct. 1988 (2018) (affirming magistrate
judge’s decision hold defendant in contempt after defendant flouted
court order to turn over computer materials to government in decrypted
state).
Criminal Motions, Motion to Suppress
Satterfield v. District Attorney Philadelphia, 872 F.3d 152 (3d Cir. 2017)
(Vanaskie, J.) (vacated and remanded) (holding that when considering a
“Rule 60(b)(6) motion premised on a change in decisional law [the dis-
trict court] must examine the full panoply of equitable circumstances in
the particular case before rendering a decision” in order to comply with
in McQuiggin v. Perkins, 569 U.S. 383 (2013)).
United States v. Washington, 869 F.3d 193 (3d Cir. 2017) (Fuentes, J.)
(McKee, J. dissenting) (establishing flexible approach for district courts to
use to whether claims of selective law enforcement necessitate pretrial
discovery).
266. Id. at 371.
267. Id. at 394.
268. Id. at 415.
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United States v. Jackson, 849 F.3d 540 (3d Cir. 2017) (Greenberg, J.)
(affirmed) (joining D.C., Fifth, Eighth and Tenth Circuits to adopt “listen-
ing post” theory, which provides that under Title III of the Omnibus
Crime Control and Safe Streets Act, “either the interception of or the
communications themselves must have been within the judge’s territorial
jurisdiction” to avoid suppression).
Double Jeopardy
United States v. Hodge, 870 F.3d 184 (3d Cir. 2017) (Chagares, J.) (af-
firmed in part, reversed in part, remanded) (concluding defendant’s mul-
tiple convictions under a single Virgin Islands statute, 14 V.I.C. § 2253(a),
violated double jeopardy).
Due Process
United States v. Fattah, 858 F.3d 801 (3d Cir. 2017) (Smith, J.) (af-
firming conviction and holding that although FBI agent acted wrongfully
by leaking information to press regarding the investigation, the FBI
agent’s actions did not violate due process).
Forfeiture
United States v. Gjeli, 867 F.3d 418 (3d Cir. 2017) (Jordan, J.) (affirmed
in part, vacated in part, remanded) (issue of first impression) (concluding
that United States v. Pitt, 193 F.3d 751 (3d Cir. 1999) was effectively over-
turned by Honeycutt v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 1626 (2017) and holding
that joint and several liability cannot be imposed in criminal or civil forfei-
ture statute because “[f]orfeiture . . . is limited to property [each] defen-
dant himself actually acquired as the result of the crime”).
Fourth Amendment
United States v. Stimler, 864 F.3d 253 (3d Cir. 2017) (Roth, J) (af-
firmed) (Restrepo, J.) (concurring in part and concurring in the judg-
ment) (concluding that government use of excluded historical cell site
location information did not amount to warrantless search).  A panel re-
hearing has been granted in his case.269
United States v. Wrensford, 866 F.3d 76 (3d Cir. 2017) (Shwartz, J.), cert
denied, 138 S. Ct. 1566 (2018) (affirmed in part, vacated in part, re-
manded) (concluding facts showed defendant’s de facto arrest was unsup-
ported by probable cause and remanding to district court to determine
whether evidence following arrest requires suppression).
269. United States v. Goldstein, 902 F.3d 411 (3d Cir. 2018) (Mem) (ordering
parties to provide supplemental briefing in light of Supreme Court’s decision in
Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206 (2018)).
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Grand Jury
In re Grand Jury Matter #3, 847 F.3d 157 (3d Cir. 2017) (per curiam)
(concluding that as long as a live controversy remains and the grand jury
proceedings continue, an appellate court retains jurisdiction over an ap-
peal of an evidentiary ruling in a grand jury proceeding, even after that
grand jury returns an indictment and superseding indictment).270
Habeas Petitions
Bruce v. Warden Lewisburg USP, 868 F.3d 170 (3d Cir. 2017) (Fisher, J.)
(affirmed) (concluding district court had jurisdiction to consider defen-
dant’s actual innocence claim under 28 U.S.C. § 2241).
Gardner v. Warden Lewisburg USP, 845 F.3d 99 (3d Cir. 2017)
(Hardiman, J.) (issue of first impression) (holding that 28 U.S.C. § 2255 is
an “adequate and effective means to adjudicate a claim of sentencing er-
ror under Alleyne v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2151, (2013)”).
Haskell v. Superintendent Greene SCI, 866 F.3d 139 (3d Cir. 2017) (Am-
bro, J.) (reversed) (issue of first impression) (granting habeas petition
holding that “the actual-prejudice standard of Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507
U.S. 619, 637–38 (1993) does not apply to claims on habeas that the state
has knowingly presented or knowingly failed to correct perjured testi-
mony” and “a reasonable likelihood that the perjured testimony affected
the judgment of the jury is all that is required”).
In re Hoffner, 870 F.3d 301 (3d Cir. 2017) (Restrepo, J.) (issue of first
impression) (holding that “whether a claim ‘relies’ on a qualifying new
rule must be construed permissively and flexibly on a case-by-case basis”
and joining Second, Sixth, Fourth and Tenth Circuits to authorize second
or successive habeas petitions under 28 U.S.C. § 2255(h) that chal-
lenge the Armed Career Criminal Act’s residual clause in light of Johnson
v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015), which held the residual clause to be
unconstitutionally vague).
Johnson v. Lamas, 850 F.3d 119 (3d Cir. 2017) (Rendell, J.) (affirmed)
(concluding that stipulated violation of Sixth Amendment’s right to con-
front witnesses was harmless under the circumstances).
Wilkerson v. Superintendent Fayette SCI, 871 F.3d 221 (3d Cir. 2017)
(Krause, J.) (affirmed in part, reversed in part, remanded) (concluding
that although defendant adequately exhausted double jeopardy claim and
was therefore entitled to pursue habeas relief under 28 U.S.C § 2254, dis-
trict court’s conclusion that no double jeopardy violation occurred was
reasonable).
270. This case was reheard en banc and the earlier opinion, 841 F.3d 177,
vacated and superseded on rehearing.
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Jury Issues
United States v. Brown, 849 F.3d 87 (3d Cir. 2017) (Jordan, J.) (af-
firmed) (holding that use of dual juries is not per se unconstitutional
under the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment and the Sixth
Amendment right to an impartial jury).
United States v. Penn, 870 F.3d 164 (3d Cir. 2017) (Smith, C.J.) (af-
firmed) (holding the district court did not abuse its discretion to remove a
juror and replace him with alternate under Federal Rule of Criminal Pro-
cedure 24(c)(1)).
Prisoner Litigation Reform Act
Gillette v. Prosper, 858 F.3d 833 (3d Cir. 2017) (Hardiman, J.) (holding
Third Circuit lacked jurisdiction to review district court’s denial of a pris-
oner’s petition under the Prisoner Litigation Reform Act because district
court’s order was not a final judgment).
Millhouse v. Heath, 866 F.3d 152 (3d Cir. 2017) (Cowen, J.) (holding
that a court “must look to the date the notice of appeal is filed—and not
the date that the Court rules on a prisoner’s motion to proceed IFP—in
assessing whether a particular dismissal counts as a strike”) (Ambro, J. dis-
senting in part and concurring in the judgment).
Parker v. Montgomery County Correctional Facility/Business Office Manager,
870 F.3d 144 (3d Cir. 2017) (Smith, C.J.) (dismissing prisoner’s appeal to
move in forma pauperis after clarifying application of three strikes rule).
Prisoner Retaliation
Oliver v. Roquet, 858 F.3d 180 (3d Cir. 2017) (Krause, J.) (reversed and
remanded) (clarifying elements of First Amendment retaliation claim
under Rauser v. Horn, 241 F.3d 330, 333 (3d Cir. 2001) and what a commit-
ted plaintiff must plead to show that protected activity was a “substantial or
motivating factor” in defendant’s actions).
Sixth Amendment – Confrontation Clause
Lambert v. Warden Greene SCI, 861 F.3d 459 (3d Cir. 2017) (Ambro, J.)
(affirmed in part, vacated in part, remanded) (concluding that trial
court’s violation of defendant’s rights under the Sixth Amendment’s con-
frontation clause excused procedural default).
Sixth Amendment - Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
Bey v. Superintendent Greene SCI, 856 F.3d 230 (3d Cir. 2017) (McKee,
J.) (vacated and remanded) (excusing defendant’s procedural default be-
cause post-conviction counsel was ineffective by failing to raise claims on
collateral attack).
McKernan v. Superintendent Smithfield SCI, 849 F.3d 557 (3d Cir. 2017)
(Roth, J.) (reversed and remanded) (issue of first impression) (granting
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habeas petition after concluding that counsel’s failure to recognize judge’s
lack of impartiality constituted ineffective assistance of counsel, and hold-
ing that “right to an impartial trial extends to a bench trial, and that such
right cannot be waived by a defendant”).
Vickers v. Superintendent Graterford SCI, 858 F.3d 841 (3d Cir. 2017)
(Krause, J.) (reversed and remanded) (holding that “where a defendant
has been apprised of his basic right to a jury trial, counsel’s failure to in-
form him of certain aspects of that right does not give rise to structural
error,” modifying United States v. Lilly, 536 F.3d 190 (3d Cir. 2008)).
Sentencing
United States v. Douglas, 849 F.3d 40 (3d Cir. 2017), rev’d and re-
manded after hearing en banc, 885 F.3d 124 (3d Cir. 2018) (reevaluated
circumstances under which U.S.S.G. § 3B1.3 sentencing enhancement
applies).
United States v. Ferguson, 876 F.3d 512 (3d Cir. 2017) (Hardiman, J.)
(affirmed) (finding court did not commit plain error by mentioning arrest
record in determining defendant’s sentence).
United States v. Graves, 877 F.3d 494 (3d Cir. 2017) (Roth, J.) (issue of
first impression) (concluded that “generic federal robbery is defined as it
is in the majority of state robbery statutes, without the requirement of
more than de minimis force.”).
United States v. Jackson, 862 F.3d 365 (3d Cir. 2017) (Cowen, J.) (join-
ing the Fifth, Eighth, and Tenth circuits to adopt an “elements-based ap-
proach” to determine how to sentence a defendant whose conviction does
not have a promulgated guideline and remanding for resentencing) (Mc-
Kee, dissenting) (arguing that the district court’s sentences were appropri-
ate) (issue of first impression).
United States v. Ley, 876 F.3d 103 (3d Cir. 2017) (Fisher, J.) (vacated
and remanded) (issue of first impression) (holding that for purposes of
U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2(a)(2), “an arrest is a formal, custodial arrest” and concur-
ring with the Sixth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits).
United States v. Martin, 867 F.3d 428 (3d Cir. 2017) (Hardiman, J.)
(affirmed) (issue of first impression) (joining the Second and Ninth Cir-
cuits to hold that even if a plea agreement stipulates to sentencing the
defendant to a lower guideline range, the appropriate guideline range is
that which is determined by the court, and accordingly, affirming district
court’s denial of defendant’s motion for a sentence reduction under 18
U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2)).
United States v. Mateo-Medina, 845 F.3d 546 (3d Cir. 2017) (McKee, J.)
(vacated and remanded) (holding district court committed plain error by
impermissibly considering defendant’s arrest record when those arrests
did not result in convictions).
United States v. Poulson, 871 F.3d 261 (3d Cir. 2017) (Rendell, J.) (af-
firmed in part, vacated in part, remanded) (issue of first impression) (join-
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ing Seventh and Eighth Circuits to find that “substantial financial
hardship” component of U.S.S.G. § 2B.1.1(b)(2)(A)–(C) is subject to a
district court’s discretion during sentencing).
United States v. Rodriguez, 855 F.3d 526 (3d Cir. 2017) (Restrepo, J.)
(affirmed) (holding that appellate court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1291 to review district court’s discretionary denial of defendant’s motion
for a sentencing reduction under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2)).
United States v. Steiner, 847 F.3d 103 (3d Cir. 2017) (Fuentes, J.) (af-
firmed in part, vacated in part, remanded) (issue of first impression) (con-
cluding that under the categorical approach, “a conviction under the
Pennsylvania burglary statute in question is not a predicate § 4B1.2 ‘crime
of violence’”).
Sufficiency of the Evidence
United States v. Ferriero, 866 F.3d 107 (3d Cir. 2017) (Scirica, J.) (af-
firmed) (affirming defendant’s conviction, forfeiture, and sentence based
on violations of the Travel Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1952, the Racketeer Influenced
and Corrupt Organizations Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c), and the federal wire
fraud statute, 18 U.S.C § 1343).
United States v. Repak, 852 F.3d 230 (3d Cir. 2017) (Smith, J.) (af-
firmed) (affirming defendant’s extortion and bribery convictions and sen-
tence in light of various challenges to evidentiary matters).
Supervised Release
United States v. Azcona-Polanco, 865 F.3d 148 (3d Cir. 2017) (Restrepo,
J.) (affirmed) (holding that the district court must explain with requisite
specificity why it decides to impose a term of supervised release upon a
deportable immigrant under U.S.S.G. § 5D1.1).
United States v. Johnson, 861 F.3d 474 (3d Cir. 2017) (Fuentes, J.) (af-
firmed) (issue of first impression) (joining Second and Fifth Circuits to
hold that when a court revokes a term of supervised release for one convic-
tion, that revocation does not terminate supervised release for a separate
conviction).
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